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ABSTRACT 
Open data are held to contribute to a wide variety of social and political goals, 
including strengthening transparency, public participation and democratic accountability, 
promoting economic growth and innovation, and enabling greater public sector efficiency 
and cost savings. However, releasing government data that contain personal information 
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may threaten privacy and related rights and interests. In this Article we ask how these 
privacy interests can be respected, without unduly hampering benefits from disclosing 
public sector information. We propose a balancing framework to help public authorities 
address this question in different contexts. The framework takes into account different 
levels of privacy risks for different types of data. It also separates decisions about access 
and re-use, and highlights a range of different disclosure routes. A circumstance 
catalogue lists factors that might be considered when assessing whether, under which 
conditions, and how a dataset can be released. While open data remains an important 
route for the publication of government information, we conclude that it is not the only 
route, and there must be clear and robust public interest arguments in order to justify the 
disclosure of personal information as open data. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Open government data refers to data released by public sector bodies, 
in a manner that is legally and technically re-usable. The G8 Open Data 
Charter states “free access to, and subsequent re-use of, open data are of 
significant value to society and the economy.”1 Open data are commonly 
held by its advocates to mean data that “can be freely used, modified, and 
shared by anyone for any purpose.”2 However, releasing public sector 
datasets that include personal information, or data that can be re-
identified, may threaten privacy and related rights. 
In this Article, we examine the tension between public sector open 
data policy and the Fair Information Principles (FIPs). The FIPs lie at the 
core of most data privacy laws around the world, including those in the 
European Union and the United States. The FIPs give guidelines to 
balance privacy-related interests and other interests, such as those of 
business and the public sector. The Article focuses on the following 
question: from the perspective of the Fair Information Principles, how can 
privacy and related interests be respected, without unduly hampering 
benefits from disclosing public sector information? 
We rely mostly on desk research, using the usual sources for legal 
scholarship, such as legislation, soft law, policy documents, and literature. 
 
 1. G8 OPEN DATA CHARTER (2013) https://www.gov.uk/government/
publications/open-data-charter/g8-open-data-charter-and-technical-annex. 
 2. OPEN DEFINITION, http://opendefinition.org (last visited May 1, 2015). Open 
Knowledge’s first open definition dates from 2005. Open Knowledge Definition 1.0, OPEN 
DEFINITION, http://opendefinition.org/od/1.0 (last visited May 1, 2015). 
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We use descriptive and analytical legal research to determine the main 
legal tensions between open data policy and the FIPs. Parts of the Article 
are more normative: we give recommendations to strike a balance that 
respects privacy and related interests, and does not unduly hamper the 
benefits of open data.  
We enriched our research results with insights from a workshop, 
where we tested hypotheses and discussed the promises and pitfalls of 
privacy and open data. Conference participants came from academia, 
industry, civil society organizations, and data protection authorities, and 
were all working on issues in open data and privacy.3 Discussions during 
the Open Data: Addressing Privacy, Security, and Civil Rights Challenges 
symposium held by the Berkeley Center for Law & Technology also 
provided valuable insights.4 
Furthermore, we conducted an empirical study into concerns that 
various stakeholders, in civil society, the public sector, research, and 
business, express about the interactions between privacy and open data. 
The study draws on document collections and digital traces from the web 
to map the debates about privacy and open data. The empirical study 
follows the “digital methods” approach, pioneered by Richard Rogers and 
his colleagues at the Digital Methods Initiative.5 
While each national legal system has its own traditions and 
characteristics, this Article focuses on common problems that arise in 
many jurisdictions. After all, as the Open Government Partnership 
(OGP) testified, governments around the world create open data policies 
and must cope with privacy concerns.6 Hence, we do not examine what 
sets jurisdictions apart, but instead discuss shared problems. For instance, 
we do not address specific requirements that follow from the First 
 
 3. Workshop, Reconciling Fair Information Principles and Open Data Policies, 
Institute for Information Law, Amsterdam, Netherlands (Feb. 6, 2015). 
 4. See Addressing Privacy, Security, and Civil Rights Challenges—19th Annual 
BCLT/BTLJ Symposium, BERKELEY LAW (Apr. 17, 2015), https://www.law.berkeley
.edu/centers/bclt/past-events/april-2015-the-19th-annual-bcltbtlj-symposium-open-data-
addressing-privacy-security-and-civil-rights-challenges/program. 
 5. See generally RICHARD ROGERS, DIGITAL METHODS (2013). 
 6. The OGP is an international platform for reform, to make “governments more 
open, accountable, and responsive to citizens.” Participating states submit action plans in 
which they make commitments, inter alia on datasets to be made available as open data. 
Compliance and progress mechanisms are in place. Membership has grown to 65 
countries in the five years since the OGP’s inception. See OPEN GOVERNMENT 
PARTNERSHIP, http://www.opengovpartnership.org (last visited May 1, 2015). 
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Amendment in the United States,7 or from the fundamental right to data 
protection in the European Union.8 Therefore, the Article’s 
recommendations come with a caveat: they cannot be directly 
implemented in national legal systems.  
The Article is structured as follows. Part II describes open data goals 
and privacy problems regarding open data. We clustered the objectives 
associated with open data into three categories:  (1) innovation and 
economic growth, (2) political accountability and democratic participation, 
and (3) public sector efficiency. We identified three kinds of concerns 
about releasing personal information as open data: (1) the chilling effects 
on people interacting with the public sector, (2) a lack of individual 
control over personal information, and (3) the use of open data for social 
sorting or discriminatory practices.  
Part III discusses rules regarding access to information held by public 
sector. Freedom of information laws provide inspiration on how to strike a 
balance between privacy and transparency in the open data context.  
Part IV discusses the governance of personal information, focusing on 
the Fair Information Principles (FIPs). In this section we also discuss the 
main challenges in reconciling open data policy and the FIPs. From a 
FIPs perspective, the main problem with open data is that unrestricted re-
use of personal data breaches the purpose specification principle. But we 
argue that there are possible compromise measures to balance privacy and 
open data interests. 
We propose a balancing framework to accommodate privacy concerns 
and open data goals. Part V outlines the first element of the balancing 
framework, and distinguishes four data categories with different levels of 
privacy risks: (A) raw personal data, (B) pseudonymized data, (C) 
anonymized data, and (D) non-personal data. Different modes of access 
and re-use control are the second element of the balancing framework. In 
many cases, disclosing data with access or re-use restrictions, rather than 
as fully open data, strikes a balance between open data goals and privacy 
(Part VI). As a third element of the balancing framework we provide a 
circumstance catalogue, a list of circumstances to consider when deciding 
 
 7. See Daniel J. Solove, Access and Aggregation: Public Records, Privacy and the 
Constitution, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1137, 1201 (2002). 
 8. For more on EU data protection law and public sector information re-use policy, 
see Cristina Dos Santos et al., On Privacy and Personal Data Protection, 6 MASARYK U. 
J.L. & TECH. 337 (2012), https://journals.muni.cz/mujlt/article/view/2613/2177; see also 
Mireille van Eechoud et al., LAPSI Position Paper on Access to Data, LAPSI (Dec. 12, 
2014), http://dare.uva.nl/document/2/162858. 
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whether or not a dataset should be disclosed, and under which conditions 
(Part VII).  
Part VIII concludes that releasing personal information as fully open 
data is generally not appropriate. But sometimes a compromise can be 
found by disclosing data with access or re-use restrictions. 
II. OPEN DATA AND PRIVACY 
Open data are held to contribute to a wide variety of social and 
political goals. However, releasing data as open data may threaten privacy, 
for instance, if the open data contain personal information. Below we 
describe open data goals and privacy problems regarding open data. We 
clustered the objectives associated with open data into three categories: (1) 
innovation and economic growth, (2) political accountability and 
democratic participation, and (3) public sector efficiency. We also 
clustered privacy concerns in the area of open data into three categories: 
(1) the chilling effects on people interacting with the public sector, (2) a 
lack of individual control over personal information, and (3) the use of 
open data for social sorting or discriminatory practices.  
A. OPEN DATA INTERESTS 
Definitions of open data from technologists and civil society actors 
focus on enabling redistribution and re-use, and on limiting legal and 
technical barriers to re-use. For example, the summary of the “Open 
Definition” from Open Knowledge reads: “Open means anyone can freely 
access, use, modify, and share for any purpose (subject, at most, to 
requirements that preserve provenance and openness).”9 The full definition 
stipulates conditions that include legal openness, bulk downloadability, 
and machine-readability.10 Similar definitions are used in the 8 Principles of 
Open Government Data,11 the Sunlight Foundation’s Ten Principles for 
Opening Up Government Information,12 and the World Wide Web 
Consortium’s Five Stars of Linked Open Data.13 
 
 9. OPEN DEFINITION, supra note 2. 
 10. Id. 
 11. OPEN DATA WORKING GROUP, The 8 Principles of Open Government Data, 
OPENGOVDATA.ORG (Dec. 8, 2007), http://opengovdata.org. 
 12. Ten Principles for Opening Up Government Information, SUNLIGHT 
FOUNDATION (Aug. 11, 2010), http://sunlightfoundation.com/policy/documents/ten
-open-data-principles.  
 13. Tim Berners-Lee, Linked Data, W3.ORG (June 18, 2009), http://www.w3.org/
DesignIssues/LinkedData.html. 
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Technical obstacles for re-using data include non-machine readable 
formats, proprietary formats, technological protection mechanisms,14 and 
Digital Rights Management software. Legal restrictions on re-use include 
intellectual property rights, such as copyright and database rights.15 When 
open data advocates say that “anyone can freely access, use, modify, and 
share [data] for any purpose,”16 they are often referring to removing these 
specific kinds of legal and technical restrictions. 
This conception of open data that focuses on limiting legal and 
technical restrictions for re-use has carried into public policy. Over the 
past decade, open data developed from being a niche idea at the margins 
of open source software, scientific research and hacker communities, into 
an idea with traction among public policymakers.17 For example, the 2013 
G8 Open Data Charter mentions that open data should be “machine 
readable,” available in bulk, available in formats for which the specification 
is “available to anyone for free,” and under open licenses such that “no 
restrictions or charges are placed on the re-use of the information for non-
commercial or commercial purposes.”18 A similar focus on removing 
technical restrictions to re-use can be found in open data guidelines of the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development,19 the U.K. 
government,20 and U.S. President Barack Obama.21 
 
 14. Technological protection mechanisms (TPMs) and digital rights management 
information are protected against circumvention and interference in their own right, 
separate from, e.g., copyright in the underlying work (database, software or other works). 
See Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, art. 11, 12, as 
amended Sept. 28, 1979, S. TREATY DOC. No. 99-27; WIPO Copyright Treaty, Dec. 20, 
1996, S. TREATY DOC. No. 105-17. 
 15. There is controversy about the role of intellectual property rights in 
implementing public sector open data, but this controversy is beyond the scope of this 
Article. 
 16. OPEN DEFINITION, supra note 2. 
 17. Jonathan Gray, Towards a Genealogy of Open Data (Sept. 3, 2014) 
(Conference Paper given at the General Conference of the European Consortium for 
Political Research in Glasgow, Scotland), http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2605828.  
 18. G8 OPEN DATA CHARTER, supra note 1.  
 19. See Barbara Ubaldi, Open Government Data: Towards Empirical Analysis of Open 
Government Data Initiatives (Organisation for Economic Co-operation & Development, 
Working Paper on Public Governance No. 22, 2013), http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/
5k46bj4f03s7-en; see also Organisation for Economic Co-operation & Development 
[OECD], OECD Recommendation of the Council for Enhanced Access and More Effective 
Use of Public Sector Information, OECD Doc. C(2008)36 (2008), https://www.oecd.org/
sti/44384673.pdf [hereinafter OECD Recommendation]. 
 20. Public Data Principles, DATA.GOV.UK (Apr. 10, 2012), http://data.gov.uk/
library/public-data-principles. 
 21. See Exec. Order No. 13,642, Making Open and Machine Readable the New 
Default for Government Information, 78 Fed. Reg. 28111 (May 9, 2013), https://www
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Open data are held to contribute to a wide variety of social and 
political goals.22 For ease of discussion in this Article, we have clustered 
the many objectives associated with open data into the following three 
areas: (1) innovation and economic growth, (2) political accountability and 
democratic participation, and (3) public sector efficiency. First we look at 
fostering innovation and economic growth.  
1. Innovation and Economic Growth 
Most official open data initiatives highlight the potential of enabling 
the re-use of public sector information to create new businesses and 
innovative services and products. Open data policies are increasingly 
becoming the preferred route to unlock the value of public sector 
information. This is evident from the European Commission’s Guidelines 
on the Public Sector Information Directive.23 President Obama’s 2013 
executive order, which aims to make Open and Machine Readable the 
New Default for Government Information, views (federal) government 
information as a national asset and recognizes the importance of enabling 
widespread re-use for “economic growth and job creation.”24 President 
Obama’s 2013 executive order on Open Data Policy adds: “making 
information resources accessible, discoverable, and usable by the public can 
help fuel entrepreneurship, innovation, and scientific discovery.”25 
Similarly, the G8 Open Data Charter claims open data are “a catalyst for 
innovation in the private sector, supporting the creation of new markets, 
businesses, and jobs.”26 The World Bank also recognizes this potential of 
open data.27 
 
.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/05/09/executive-order-making-open-and
-machine-readable-new-default-government- [hereinafter Exec. Order, Open and 
Machine Readable].  
 22. See, e.g., Gray, supra note 17. 
 23. Commission Notice: Guidelines on Recommended Standard Licenses, Datasets 
and Charging for the Re-Use of Documents, 2014 O.J. (C 240) 1. 
 24. Exec. Order, Open and Machine Readable, supra note 21. The Order is one of 
several that follow up on open government policy announced by the White House in 
January 2009. Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies on 
Transparency and Open Government, 74 Fed. Reg. 15 (Jan. 21, 2009). 
 25. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, OMB 
MEMORANDUM M-13-13, OPEN DATA POLICY—MANAGING INFORMATION AS AN 
ASSET (2013), http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/memoranda/2013/m
-13-13.pdf [hereinafter OMB MEMORANDUM M-13-13, OPEN DATA POLICY]. 
 26. See G8 OPEN DATA CHARTER, supra note 1. It was signed by G8 leaders on 
June 18, 2013 to promote transparency, innovation, and accountability. 
 27. WORLD BANK, OPEN DATA FOR ECONOMIC GROWTH 5 (2014).  
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Information services built on public sector data are diverse. Financial 
services providers use official statistics as input.28 Companies in the 
meteorological sector use weather data to provide highly specialized 
services, e.g., forecasts for off-shore oil industries.29 Planning permissions, 
zoning data and housing data are combined with other sources to produce 
advice for customers such as real estate developers.30 Postal codes are 
widely used as identifiers.31 School and health inspection data serve as 
input for apps that help inform parents or patient choice.32 Public 
transport timetable data when combined with geolocation data enable 
real-time and customized travel advice.33 There are many other kinds of 
commercial exploitation of open data, often involving the combination of 
data from different public and private sources to deliver information 
products or services. The emphasis on economic benefits of re-using data 
held by public sector bodies predates open data policies. For example, in 
1989, the E.U. sought to stimulate commercial exploitation of public 
sector data by the private sector.34 The E.U. Public Sector Information 
Directive of 2003 also focused on public sector information as raw 
material for creating services and products.35 The Directive obliged a wide 
range of public sector bodies to allow commercial and non-commercial re-
 
 28. For examples of government information re-use, see MARTIN FORNEFELD ET 
AL., MICUS, REPORT FOR THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION, ASSESSMENT OF THE RE-
USE OF PUBLIC SECTOR INFORMATION (PSI) (2009); MAKX DEKKERS ET AL., 
MEASURING EUROPEAN PUBLIC SECTOR INFORMATION RESOURCES (MEPSIR), 
REPORT FOR THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION, FINAL REPORT OF STUDY ON 
EXPLOITATION OF PUBLIC SECTOR INFORMATION 37 (2006). 
 29. For example, consider the private company MeteoGroup. See Marine, 
METEOGROUP, http://www.meteogroup.com/en/gb/sectors/marine.html (last visited 
May 15, 2015).  
 30. For example, in Europe, the company Landmark provides such services and took 
the city of Amsterdam to court for the price it charged for re-use of city data. See ABRvS 
20 april 2009, AB 2009, 546 m.nt. JJB (B&W Amsterdam/Landmark) (Neth.). 
 31. For this reason the G8 Open Data Charter lists postal codes as “high value” 
data, to be made available with priority. G8 OPEN DATA CHARTER, supra note 1.  
 32. U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, FOSTERING INNOVATION, CREATING JOBS, 
DRIVING BETTER DECISIONS: THE VALUE OF GOVERNMENT DATA (2014); G8 
OPEN DATA CHARTER, supra note 1; MCKINSEY & CO., OPEN DATA: UNLOCKING 
INNOVATION AND PERFORMANCE WITH LIQUID INFORMATION 11 (2013). 
 33. See MCKINSEY & CO., supra note 32, at 6. 
 34. Directorate Gen. for Telecomm., Info. Indus. & Innovation, Comm’n of the 
European Cmtys., Guidelines for Improving the Synergy Between the Public and Private 
Sectors in the Information Market (1989).  
 35. Directive 2003/98/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 
November 2003 on the Re-use of Public Sector Information, 2003 O.J. (L 345) 90 
(revised by Directive 2013/37/EC, 2013 O.J. (L 175) 1). 
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use of their information assets, but not necessarily as open data.36 Under 
the directive, conditions may be imposed, costs charged, and data may be 
made available in non-structured form. The U.S. Office of Management 
& Budget also recognized federal information as a “commodity in the 
marketplace.”37  
Many studies have been commissioned to assess the value of public 
sector information; these studies suggest impressive figures, but range 
widely.38 For example, the U.S. Department of Commerce looked at the 
size of private sector revenues from “government data-intensive business 
activities” for the United States and arrived at a crude estimate in the 
range of 24 to 221 billion USD per year.39 And a 2000 study for the 
European Commission estimated that for the then 15 E.U. member 
states, the part of the combined national income attributable to industries 
and activities built on exploiting public sector information ranged between 
€28 billion and €134 billion. Some have judged these estimates as far too 
 
 36. The obligation to allow re-use was introduced in the 2013 revision. Directive 
2013/37/EC, 2013 O.J. (L 175) 1. Member states must implement the revised directive 
by July 2015. The Directive builds on public access regimes in member states; it does not 
regulate access directly.  
 37. Office of Mgmt. & Budget, Exec. Office of the President, OMB Circular No. 
A-130 Revised, MANAGEMENT OF FEDERAL INFORMATION RESOURCES (1998). First 
issued in 1985, the Circular fostered (among many things) a larger role for the private 
sector in dissemination of government information and creating added-value (electronic) 
services. With subsequent revisions (1993–1996) under the Clinton administration the 
focus moved to release of electronic information by federal agencies directly to the public. 
For an overview of early policy development, see U.S. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY 
ASSESSMENT, OTA-C IT-396, INFORMING THE NATION: FEDERAL INFORMATION 
DISSEMINATION IN AN ELECTRONIC AGE (1988) [hereinafter FEDERAL INFORMATION 
DISSEMINATION IN AN ELECTRONIC AGE].  
 38. For recent examples of studies on the economic value of public sector 
information at the E.U. level, see MARC DE VRIES ET AL., PRICING OF PUBLIC 
SECTOR INFORMATION. MODELS OF SUPPLY AND CHARGING FOR PUBLIC SECTOR 
INFORMATION, FINAL REPORT (2011); MARC DE VRIES ET AL., REPORT FOR 
EUROPEAN COMMISSION, PRICING OF PUBLIC SECTOR INFORMATION STUDY 
(POPSIS) (2011). For recent examples of studies about the value of open data and public 
sector information at the national level, see U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, supra note 32; 
DELOITTE, MARKET ASSESSMENT OF PUBLIC SECTOR INFORMATION, STUDY FOR 
U.K. DEPARTMENT FOR BUSINESS, INNOVATION, & SKILLS (2013); U.K. OFFICE OF 
FAIR TRADING, OFT861, THE COMMERCIAL USE OF PUBLIC INFORMATION (2006). 
For examples of subnational level studies, see Jens PREISCHE, DIGITALES GOLD: 
NUTZEN UND WERTSCHÖPFUNG DURCH OPEN DATA FÜR BERLIN (2014); Gregor 
Eibl & Brigitte Lutz, Money for Nothing—Data for Free: Hard Facts About the Economic 
Power of Open Government Data, in CEDEM13: CONFERENCE FOR E-DEMOCRACY 
AND OPEN GOVERNMENT 289 (Peter Parycek & Noelle Edelmann eds., 2d ed. 2013). 
 39. U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, supra note 32. 
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optimistic.40 Generally, researchers recognize there is a lack of hard data 
on which to base estimates.41 Nevertheless, policymakers see fostering 
innovation and economic growth as an important goal of open data. 
2. Political Accountability and Democratic Participation 
A second goal pursued through open data policy is fostering political 
accountability and democratic participation. Current proactive disclosure 
policies cover a broad range of information: from basic information about 
a public authority’s responsibility, organization, and procedures, to 
granular data about public spending and subsidies awarded.42 
In the open data context, statements about the perceived benefits of 
open data for democracy are frequent. The G8 Open Data Charter 
mentions good governance and anti-corruption,43 and argues that more 
public data on the use of natural resources and distribution of revenues, on 
land management, and on development spending would promote 
accountability and good governance.44 The World Bank makes a similar 
case, arguing that open data “supports democratic societies” and 
“encourages greater citizen participation in government affairs.”45 The 
French government’s open data policy is driven by the idea that “opening 
and sharing data is the way for modern government to organize itself so 
that it is accountable, opens dialogue and trusts the collective intelligence 
of its citizens.”46 The Obama administration posits that making 
information available proactively online in open formats increases 
 
 40. Robbin te Velde, Public Sector Information: Why Bother?, in THE SOCIO-
ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF PUBLIC SECTOR INFORMATION ON DIGITAL NETWORKS: 
TOWARD A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF DIFFERENT ACCESS AND REUSE POLICIES: 
WORKSHOP SUMMARY 25, 25–28 (P. Uhlir ed., 2009). 
 41. See Mireille van Eechoud, Calculating and Monitoring the Benefits of Public Sector 
Information Re-use, in ZUGANG UND VERWERTUNG ÖFFENTLICHER INFORMATIONEN 
(Thomas Dreier et al. eds., forthcoming 2015).  
 42. See, e.g., Cabinet Office Organogram, DATA.GOV.UK, http://data.gov.uk/
organogram/cabinet-office; Senior Officials “High Earners” Salaries, DATA.GOV.UK, 
http://data.gov.uk/dataset/uk-civil-service-high-earners; Where Does Europe’s Money Go? 
A Guide to EU Budget Data Sources, OPEN KNOWLEDGE BLOG (July 2, 2015), 
http://blog.okfn.org/2015/07/02/where-does-europes-money-go. 
 43. G8 OPEN DATA CHARTER, supra note 1, ¶¶ 4–5.  
 44. Id.  
 45.  Open Data Toolkit, WORLD BANK, http://opendatatoolkit.worldbank.org/en/
starting.html. 
 46. This language is translated from “L’ouverture et le partage des données, c’est la 
manière, pour un Etat moderne, de s’organiser afin de rendre des comptes, d’ouvrir le 
dialogue, et de faire confiance à l’intelligence collective des citoyens.” SÉCRETARIAT 
GÉNÉRAL POUR LA MODERNISATION DE LA FONCTION PUBLIQUE, VADE-MECUM: 
SUR L’OUVERTURE ET LE PARTAGE DES DONNÉES PUBLIQUES 5 (2013). 
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accountability and promotes informed participation by the public.47 A 
basic consideration of policy for the management of U.S. federal 
information is that public disclosure of government information is 
essential to the operation of a democracy.48 Similarly, the E.U. Public 
Sector Information Directive says that publishing documents held by the 
public sector “is a fundamental instrument for extending the right to 
knowledge, which is a basic principle of democracy.”49 
The idea of open government is tied to the ideal of transparency of 
governments’ decisions and activities. Transparency is widely regarded as a 
precondition for the effective exercise of political rights and freedoms, and 
for ensuring accountable public authorities.50 Access to information is a 
key aspect of democratic institutions that are based on representation, 
delegation, and accountability. Assessing, debating, and sanctioning public 
sector behavior requires accurate information.51 In sum, the proactive 
disclosure of government data to the public for the purposes of political 
transparency, accountability and participation is becoming a central tenet 
in democratic governance. 
 
 47. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, OMB 
MEMORANDUM M-10-06, OPEN GOVERNMENT DIRECTIVE (2009), https://www
.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/assets/memoranda_2010/m10-06.pdf. 
 48. See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, OMB 
CIRCULAR NO. A-130 REVISED, TRANSMITTAL 2, MANAGEMENT OF FEDERAL 
INFORMATION RESOURCES (1994) (older revision of the Circular); OFFICE OF MGMT. 
& BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, OMB CIRCULAR NO. A-130 
REVISED, TRANSMITTAL 4, MANAGEMENT OF FEDERAL INFORMATION RESOURCES 
(2000) (current version of the Circular). The Circular has a residual role: it does not 
affect disclosure duties or rights to information under FOIA. 
 49. Recital 16 of the PSI Directive states:  
Making public all generally available documents held by the public 
sector—concerning not only the political process but also the legal and 
administrative process—is a fundamental instrument for extending the 
right to knowledge, which is a basic principle of democracy. This 
objective is applicable to institutions at every level, be it local, national 
or international.  
Directive 2003/98/EC, supra note 35. 
 50. For an expanded discussion of transparency, see CHRISTOPHER HOOD, & 
DAVID HEALD, TRANSPARENCY: THE KEY TO BETTER GOVERNANCE? (2006); 
MARK BOVENS ET AL., THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY 
(2014). 
 51. Like transparency, accountability is a multifaceted concept. For a discussion of 
dimensions in relation to democracy, see Gijs Jan Brandsma & Thomas Schillemans, The 
Accountability Cube: Measuring Accountability, 23 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. THEORY 953 
(2013). 
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3. Public Sector Efficiency and Service Delivery 
A third set of pro open data arguments focuses on efficiency: open 
data should help to save resources and improve public services. For 
instance, the European Commission says open data will improve health 
services and traffic management, and help tackle environmental 
challenges, for instance through monitoring energy consumption.52  
At the national level, an increasingly popular strategy is to publish 
performance data of publicly funded organizations.53 Disclosing inspection 
and other data is alleged to improve performance of recipients of tax 
monies, like schools (test scores) and hospitals (deaths, waiting times).54 
Citizens in their capacity as customers are presumed to make better-
informed choices when provided with such performance data.55 Other 
initiatives serve to improve compliance and to assist in better policymaking 
or prioritizing enforcement, for instance in the area of food safety 
standards or building safety.56 Some open government data initiatives 
propose a more active role for the public: as an army of armchair auditors 
who can help identify possible savings.57  
Furthermore, open data are expected to help public sector bodies carry 
out their tasks. Many users of open data portals are from the public 
sector.58 Efficiency gains made when more transparency about information 
resources leads to less duplication of information collection, and hence 
more shared use of resources, are said to improve public sector services.59 
Furthermore, public sector bodies are expected to improve their services 
when they have more information at their disposal.60 Efficient use of 
 
 52. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament et al. on Open 
Data: An Engine for Innovation, Growth and Transparent Governance, at 3, COM (2011) 
882 final (Dec. 12, 2011), http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=
COM:2011:0882:FIN:EN:PDF. 
 53. Mireille van Eechoud, Inaugural Lecture at the Institute for Information Law at 
University of Amsterdam: De Lokroep van Open Data 9 (May 23, 2014), 
http://www.ivir.nl/publicaties/download/1407. 
 54. Id. at 9. 
 55. MCKINSEY & CO., supra note 32, at 83–85. 
 56. See, e.g., Michael Flowers, Beyond Open Data: The Data-Driven City, in 
BEYOND TRANSPARENCY 185 (Brett Goldstein & Lauren Dyson eds., 2013), 
 57. See BEN WORTHY, DAVID CAMERON’S TRANSPARENCY REVOLUTION? 9 
(2013), http://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2361428. 
 58. See WORLD BANK, supra note 27.  
 59. McKinsey, supra note 32, at 57–58 (making this case for the energy sector). 
 60. See Alan Feuer, The Mayor’s Geek Squad, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 23, 2013), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/24/nyregion/mayor-bloombergs-geek-squad.html 
(discussing the advantages of combining existing data to yield useful information for, e.g., 
disaster relief efforts or environmental pollution). 
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information resources is not a new concern of governments. For several 
decades information management policies have been argued to increase 
government efficiency.61 
In an empirical mapping study, we found that different arguments for 
open data obtain varying levels of attention amongst different actors in 
different forms of digital media.62 For example, in English language 
mainstream media outlets arguments and examples about the economic 
growth and technological innovation potential of open data received more 
attention than those related to public participation or democratic 
accountability. On social media platforms such as Twitter, distinct groups 
of actors were interested in different sets of topics around open data such 
that, for example, some were interested in startups and smart cities, and 
others were interested in transparency and open government.63 
In sum, open data policies serve diverse interests. For the purposes of 
this Article, these can be clustered into: (1) innovation and economic 
growth, (2) political accountability and democratic participation, and (3) 
public sector efficiency. 
B. PRIVACY INTERESTS 
At the global level, the right to privacy is protected under, for instance, 
the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights64 and the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.65 In the United States, the Fourth 
Amendment and other laws protect privacy.66 In Europe, the European 
Convention on Human Rights,67 the European Union Charter of 
 
 61. FEDERAL INFORMATION DISSEMINATION IN AN ELECTRONIC AGE, supra 
note 37. 
 62. Jonathan Gray et al., Mapping the Politics of Open Data on Digital Media (in 
preparation) (on file with authors). 
 63. Id. 
 64. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 12, G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N. 
Doc. A/810, at 71 (1948). 
 65. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 17, Dec. 16, 1966, S. 
Treaty Doc. No. 95-20, 6 I.L.M. 368 (1967), 999 U.N.T.S. 171. 
 66. See generally WILLIAM CUDDIHY, THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: ORIGINS AND 
ORIGINAL MEANING 602–1791 (2009); DANIEL SOLOVE & PAUL SCHWARTZ, 
INFORMATION PRIVACY LAW 260–335 (5th ed., 2014). 
 67. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 
art. 8, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222 [hereinafter ECHR] (also referred to as the 
European Convention on Human Rights). 
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Fundamental Rights,68 national constitutions, and other laws protect 
privacy.69  
Public sector bodies hold an enormous amount of personal 
information, and this amount will likely grow. For instance, so-called 
“smart cities” may provide the public sector information about people such 
as up-to-date location data of cars, and detailed electricity metering data.70 
And, as public sector bodies offer more services online, they will obtain 
even more information about people.71 Sometimes citizens volunteer 
personal information, for example when they use public services. But 
public authorities can also collect information through third parties, like 
educational and health care institutions.72 And authorities can compel 
citizens to provide personal information. This element of force heightens 
privacy concerns. 
We distinguish three broad categories of privacy concerns regarding 
open data: (1) the chilling effects on people in their interaction with the 
public sector, (2) a lack of individual control over personal information, 
and (3) the use of open data as input for social sorting and discriminatory 
practices.73  
 
 68. Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union of the European 
Parliament, arts. 7–8, 2010 O.J. (C 83) 2, 1 [hereinafter E.U. Charter of Fundamental 
Rights]. 
 69. See, e.g., Grondwet voor het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden [Constitution of the 
Kingdom of the Netherlands], art. 10. Furthermore, each E.U. member state has a 
national data protection act implementing the European Parliament’s directive “on the 
protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free 
movement of such data.” Council Directive 95/46/EC, art. 28, 1995 O.J. (L 281). 
 70. A smart city has been defined “as one that has digital technology embedded 
across all city functions.” Definitions and Overviews, SMART CITIES COUNCIL, 
http://smartcitiescouncil.com/smart-cities-information-center/definitions-and-overviews 
(last visited May 1, 2015); see also Robert G. Hollands, Will the Real Smart City Please 
Stand Up? Intelligent, Progressive or Entrepreneurial?, 12 CITY 303 (2008). 
 71. Teresa Scassa, Privacy and Open Government, 6 FUTURE INTERNET 397, 397–
98 (2014).  
 72. See Solove, Access and Aggregation, supra note 7, at 1142–50 (contains an 
overview of federal, state, and local record collection in the United States). 
 73. FREDERIK ZUIDERVEEN BORGESIUS, IMPROVING PRIVACY PROTECTION IN 
THE AREA OF BEHAVIOURAL TARGETING 53–63 (2015). The three categories are based 
on that study, which does not concern open data. In this Article, we adapt the categories 
to the open data context. 
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1. Chilling Effects 
First, a chilling effect can occur if people interacting with public bodies 
fear that their information will be stored, or will be made public.74 For 
example, people might be less inclined to contact public sector agencies if 
they doubt that their personal data will remain confidential.75  
People often provide personal information when engaging with public 
sector bodies. Public sector bodies often require information, for example, 
when people apply for a planning permission or business license, attempt 
to comply with health and safety standards, or submit tax claims or grant 
applications. The collection, use and exchange of personal information are 
part of the normal fabric of public sector activity. Many public services 
cannot be delivered without these activities.  
People might refrain from contacting the public sector if they fear 
their personal information will not be kept confidential. Especially people 
with questions about diseases, pregnancies, drugs, financial troubles, or 
suicidal thoughts might refrain from asking for help. Jeff Jonas and Jim 
Harper illustrate the importance of communicating with the public sector 
without disclosing too much personal information with an example 
regarding a migrant.76 Say Alice is a migrant who thinks her residence 
permit contains errors. If she thinks that visiting the immigration website 
will bring her to the attention of immigration law enforcement, she might 
forego looking for information. “If she cannot communicate this 
information anonymously, she almost certainly will not ask questions or 
volunteer information, denying herself help she might deserve while 
denying policymakers relevant information.”77 If Alice thought her data 
would be disclosed to others in and outside government, such a chilling 
effect might be greater.  
By itself the chilling effect already harms the individual who refrains 
from an activity she might otherwise engage in. But if somebody does not 
seek help because of a chilling effect, for instance if someone does not seek 
information regarding a disease, he or she may also experience more 
 
 74. See KIERON O’HARA, TRANSPARENT GOVERNMENT, NOT TRANSPARENT 
CITIZENS: A REPORT ON PRIVACY AND TRANSPARENCY FOR THE CABINET OFFICE 
24 (2011), http://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/
file/61279/transparency-and-privacy-review-annex-a.pdf. 
 75. Jeff Jonas & Jim Harper, Open Government: The Privacy Imperative, in OPEN 
GOVERNMENT: TRANSPARENCY, COLLABORATION, AND PARTICIPATION IN PRACTICE 
315, 322–23 (Daniel Lathrop & Laurel R. T. Ruma eds., 2010). 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. at 317. 
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tangible harms. People foregoing treatment of infectious diseases could 
harm society as a whole.  
Uncertainty about what happens with one’s personal information can 
ultimately adversely impact the quality of public services. As Teresa Scassa 
notes, with open data “there is a risk not only to individual privacy, but 
also to the relationship of trust that is meant to exist between citizens and 
their government.”78 Government statistics offices have realized for a long 
time that confidentiality of census answers is important—otherwise people 
might not give honest answers anymore. Trust in public authorities could 
diminish if people do not believe that their personal data will remain 
confidential.79 In sum, open data policy could lead to a chilling effect on 
people communicating with the public sector, which is a privacy problem.  
2. Lack of Control over Personal Information 
A second privacy concern is that people lack control over their 
personal information if that information is released as open data. Publicly 
releasing personal information as open data can be especially troublesome 
because open data policy in its most liberal form implies that unlimited 
numbers of re-users can use the data for any purpose.  
Many privacy definitions focus on individual control over personal 
information. For instance, Alan Westin defined privacy in 1967 as “the 
claim of individuals, groups, or institutions to determine when, how, and 
to what extent information about them is communicated to others.”80 
Many scholars use similar privacy definitions.81 The privacy as control 
perspective is apparent in legal practice. For instance, the U.S. Supreme 
Court has described privacy as “the individual’s control of information 
concerning his or her person.”82 The German Supreme Court says a 
person has, in principle, the right “to determine for himself whether his 
 
 78. Scassa, supra note 71, at 408.  
 79. See, e.g., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-01-126SP, RECORD 
LINKAGE AND PRIVACY: ISSUES IN CREATING NEW FEDERAL RESEARCH AND 
STATISTICAL INFORMATION 18 (2001). 
 80. ALAN F. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 7 (reprint 1970) (1967).  
 81. See Charles Fried, Privacy, 77 YALE L.J. 475, 482 (1968) (discussing that 
privacy “is not simply an absence of information about us in the minds of others; rather it 
is the control we have over information about ourselves.”). See also A.R. MILLER, THE 
ASSAULT ON PRIVACY: COMPUTERS, DATA BANKS, AND DOSSIERS 25 (1971) 
(describing privacy as “the individual’s ability to control the circulation of information 
relating to him”). 
 82. U.S. Dep’t of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 
749, 763 (1988). 
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personal data should be divulged or utilized.”83 Privacy as control has 
deeply influenced the Fair Information Principles.84 The privacy as control 
perspective does not capture all the subtleties of privacy. Nevertheless, a 
loss of individual control over personal information is widely seen as a 
privacy problem.85  
A lack of individual control over personal information can lead to 
subjective and objective privacy harm. Objective harm is, in Ryan Calo’s 
words, “the unanticipated or coerced use of information concerning a 
person against that person.”86 The Eightmaps website provides an example 
of objective harm resulting from data released by the public sector.87 
Proposition 8 was a 2008 proposal to amend the California constitution 
with a referendum to ban gay marriage.88 California law requires that 
campaign donations be published.89 An anonymous website publisher took 
information regarding donors who supported Proposition 8, and overlaid 
that information on Google Maps.90 The map showed information such as 
the donor’s name, approximate location, and the amount donated. Some 
of the donors received death threats, or were the victim of boycotts.91 The 
dissemination of correct information can already produce objective harms, 
but the potential of harm arising from the public release of inaccurate or 
false data is at least as large.  
 
 83. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Mar. 25, 
1982, BGBL. I 369, 1982 (Ger.), translated in E.H. Riedel, New Bearings in German Data 
Protection, 5 HUM. RTS. L.J. 94, 101 (1984) .  
 84. See, e.g., COLIN J. BENNETT, REGULATING PRIVACY: DATA PROTECTION 
AND PUBLIC POLICY IN EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES 14 (1992). See infra Part 
IV. 
 85. See, e.g., Fahriye Seda Gürses, Multilateral Privacy Requirements Analysis in 
Online Social Networks (May 2010) (Ph.D. thesis, University of Leuven); HELEN 
NISSENBAUM, PRIVACY IN CONTEXT: TECHNOLOGY, POLICY, AND THE INTEGRITY 
OF SOCIAL LIFE (2010); Daniel J. Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 
477 (2006). 
 86. Ryan Calo, The Boundaries of Privacy Harm, 86 IND. L.J. 1131, 1133 (2011). 
 87. Eightmaps.com and Too Much Information, DALLAS MORNING NEWS (Jan. 14, 
2009); see also Michael Shin, Show Me the Money! The Geography of Contributions to 
California’s Proposition 8, 1 CAL. J. POL. & POL’Y 10 (2009). See generally on privacy-
invasive online map services: Mark Burdon, Privacy Invasive Geo-Mashups: Privacy 2.0 
and the Limits of First Generation Information Privacy Laws, 2010 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & 
POL’Y 1 (2010). 
 88. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7.5 (enacted as California 2008 Ballot Proposition 8), 
ruled unconstitutional in Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F.Supp.2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 2010). 
 89. Deborah G. Johnson, Priscilla M. Regan & Kent Wayland, Campaign 
Disclosure, Privacy and Transparency, 19 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 959, 972 (2011).  
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. See also Brad Stone, Disclosure, Magnified on the Web, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7, 
2009, at BU3, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/08/business/08stream.html. 
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The feeling of having no control over one’s personal information is a 
“subjective harm,” described by Calo as “the perception of loss of control 
that results in fear or discomfort.”92 Many people are uncomfortable with 
organizations processing large amounts of information about them. 
Furthermore, there is often information asymmetry between the individual 
and the organization that uses personal information. People may know 
that information about them is collected and stored, but may not know 
how this will be used. If people do not know who holds data about them, 
they cannot exercise control over those data.93 Releasing data to an 
undetermined number of re-users aggravates the lack of control. 
Furthermore, data privacy rules that apply to the public sector are 
often stricter than those that apply to the private sector.94 However, if the 
public sector releases personal data as open data, that is, with no 
restrictions, the private sector can subsequently use those data, subject to 
more lenient (statutory) rules.95 Hence, releasing personal data as open 
data reduces privacy protection. Furthermore, the more datasets 
governments disclose, the richer the possibilities for re-identification. In 
sum, releasing personal information as open data causes a lack of 
individual control over personal information. 
3. Social Sorting and Discrimination 
A third privacy-related concern is that open data could be used as 
input for social sorting and discriminatory practices.96 For instance, if the 
public sector released personal data, data brokers would likely be among 
 
 92. Calo, supra note 86, at 1143. 
 93. See generally Alessandro Acquisti & Jens Grossklags, What Can Behavioral 
Economics Teach Us About Privacy?, in DIGITAL PRIVACY: THEORY, TECHNOLOGIES 
AND PRACTICES 363 (Sabrina De Capitani di Vimercati et al. eds., 2007); ZUIDERVEEN 
BORGESIUS, IMPROVING PRIVACY PROTECTION, supra note 73, at 201–05. According 
to Solove, the feeling of lost control resembles Franz Kafka’s THE TRIAL. DANIEL J. 
SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON: TECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY IN THE INFORMATION 
AGE 38 (2004). He suggests the main problem is “not knowing what is happening, 
having no say or ability to exercise meaningful control over the process.” Id. at 38. 
 94. For instance, in the United States the Privacy Act of 1974 does not apply to the 
private sector. Pub. L. No. 93-579, 88 Stat. 1896 (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 552a (2012)). In 
the European Union, firms more easily meet the required legal basis test for personal data 
processing than public sector bodies do. See Directive 95/46/EC, supra note 69. Article 
7(f) applies to firms; Article 7(e) applies to the public sector. 
 95. Scassa, supra note 71, at 405, 402. 
 96. See, e.g., Solon Barocas & Andrew Selbst, Big Data’s Disparate Impact, 104 
CALIF. L. REV. (forthcoming 2016), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2477899; EXEC. OFFICE 
OF THE PRESIDENT, BIG DATA: SEIZING OPPORTUNITIES, PRESERVING VALUES 51 
(2014), http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/big_data_privacy_report_may
_1_2014.pdf; Scassa, supra note 71, at 407. 
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the main re-users.97 Data brokers are “companies that collect consumers’ 
personal information and resell or share that information with 
others.”98 The information can be used, for instance, for direct marketing, 
credit scoring, or screening job applicants.99  
Many find data brokers’ activities unfair and privacy-invasive.100 As the 
Federal Trade Commission notes, personal information could be used for 
unfair discrimination. For instance, a company might use the information 
that there is a “Smoker in Household” to conclude that people in that 
household should not be offered insurance.101 In surveillance studies, such 
practices are called “social sorting.” As David Lyon explains, social sorting 
involves “obtain[ing] personal and group data in order to classify people 
and populations according to varying criteria, to determine who should be 
targeted for special treatment, suspicion, eligibility, inclusion, access, and 
so on.”102 Social sorting is not inherently bad or good.103  
For social sorting, data brokers can also use open data that do not 
include personal information. For instance, the average housing price in a 
certain zip code is not personal information. But that average price could 
be matched with somebody’s address to estimate the value of his or her 
house. Hence, non-personal information can be used to enrich digital 
dossiers about people.  
The following is another example of a social sorting effect resulting 
from open data. Suppose a city council releases crime statistics. A vendor 
 
 97. Thomas P. Keenan, Are They Making Our Privates Public? Emerging Risks of 
Governmental Open Data Initiatives, in PRIVACY AND IDENTITY MANAGEMENT FOR 
LIFE 1, 11 (Jan Camenisch et al. eds., 2012). See also Solove, Access and Aggregation, supra 
note 7, at 1148–50. 
 98. See also U.S. FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, DATA BROKERS: A CALL FOR 
TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY 1 (2014), http://www.ftc.gov/system/files/
documents/reports/data-brokers-call-transparency-accountability-report-federal-trade
-commission-may-2014/140527databrokerreport.pdf.  
 99. See Scassa, supra note 71, at 407.  
 100. See generally Chris Jay Hoofnagle, Big Brother’s Little Helpers: How ChoicePoint 
and Other Commercial Data Brokers Collect and Package Your Data for Law Enforcement, 29 
N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 595 (2003); JOSEPH TUROW, NICHE ENVY: 
MARKETING DISCRIMINATION IN THE DIGITAL AGE (2006); JOSEPH TUROW, THE 
DAILY YOU: HOW THE NEW ADVERTISING INDUSTRY IS DEFINING YOUR IDENTITY 
AND YOUR WORTH (2011). 
 101. FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, DATA BROKERS, supra note 98, at 55–56.  
 102. David Lyon, Surveillance as Social Sorting: Computer Codes and Mobile Bodies, in 
SURVEILLANCE AS SOCIAL SORTING: PRIVACY, RISK AND DIGITAL DISCRIMINATION 
13 (David Lyon ed., 2002) [hereinafter Lyon, Surveillance as Social Sorting].  
 103. David Lyon, Kevin Haggerty & Kirstie Ball, Introducing Surveillance Studies, in 
ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF SURVEILLANCE STUDIES 3 (Kirstie Ball, Kevin Haggerty 
& David Lyon eds., 2012).  
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of GPS car systems can overlay its own maps with the crime data in order 
to designate high-crime areas. The car GPS system can then route the 
driver around those areas. The practice could be seen as unfair for the 
people and businesses in that newly invented no-go area. In the no-go 
areas, insurance premiums might rise, and real estate prices and shop 
profits might drop.  
In sum, potential privacy problems regarding open data include 
chilling effects on people communicating with the public sector, a lack of 
individual control over personal information, and discriminatory practices 
enabled by the released data. Hence, especially when datasets contain 
personal data, public sector bodies should give due consideration to the 
risks of disclosing data. We discuss below how to strike a balance between 
open data policy and privacy. But first we turn to the rules and guidelines 
that govern the disclosure of public sector information. 
III. GOVERNANCE OF PUBLIC SECTOR INFORMATION 
In this section we discusses governance frameworks regarding access to 
public sector information. We discuss norms that govern open data, and 
norms that govern access to public sector information more generally. 
Freedom of information laws provide inspiration on how to strike a 
balance between privacy and transparency in the open data context. 
A. OPEN DATA NORMS  
Obligations for public authorities to release information as open data 
tend not to be encoded in hard law. Rather, open data policy is often 
promoted through administrative hierarchies, whereby the policy 
objectives, targets, and instructions range from superficial and permissive 
to detailed and strict.104 Open data policymaking is partly shaped through 
 
 104. For example, the 2013 order by President Obama breathes ambition and 
decisiveness, and the elaboration by the Office for Management & Budget of its Open 
Data Policy Memorandum contains specific duties for departments to create lists of 
available data sets (“Public Data Listing”) and engage with user groups to prioritize 
release. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, 
SUPPLEMENTAL GUIDANCE ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF MEMORANDUM M-13-13 
(2013), https://project-open-data.cio.gov/implementation-guide/; see also OMB 
MEMORANDUM M-13-13, OPEN DATA POLICY, supra note 25. The E.U.’s Public 
Sector Information Directive shows a preference for the release of data in open formats, 
and also demands that member states make practical arrangements “that help re-users in 
their search for documents available for re-use,” e.g., in the form of asset registers. 
Directive 2003/98/EC, supra note 35. The E.C. Guidelines clearly favor pro-active 
release of data as open.  
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political commitment in international forums such as the G8 and the 
Open Government Partnership.105 
Open data initiatives rely on norms that regulate access to information. 
After all, open government data are, by definition, publicly available data. 
A myriad of such norms exists at the national level. The most generic 
disclosure duties arise under freedom of information acts, which typically 
cover the executive branch. Constitutional and administrative norms that 
help cement basic checks and balances also have implications for access to 
information, mandating for example that legislative texts are published,106 
and that the public has access to court decisions.107  
Additionally, many countries have dedicated laws that govern 
information production for specific purposes, such as (national) statistics 
to aid policy development and monitoring,108 land registries to facilitate 
secure property transactions, business registers,109 or earth observation data 
produced for environmental and agricultural management.110 Such specific 
laws will often lay down modalities for access. For example, confidentiality 
of identifiable information is of fundamental interest for the production of 
reliable and useful statistics. Hence, a basic principle in instruments that 
govern the production and dissemination of statistics is that personal 
information supplied for statistical purposes will not be disclosed or used 
 
 105. Through the Open Data Charter, the members of G8 have committed to 
drafting national open data action plans. Supra note 1. The same mechanism is used by 
the Open Government Partnership. Supra note 6. 
 106. See, e.g., 1958 CONST. arts. 10–11 (Fr.); GRUNDGESETZ FÜR DIE 
BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND [GRUNDGESETZ] [GG] [BASIC LAW], May 23, 
1949, BGBL. I, Art. 82 (Ger.). 
 107. For example, Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights (on the 
right to a fair trial) prescribes that court decisions are to be made public. ECHR, supra 
note 67, art. 6. This will usually be through delivery in court but may be achieved by 
other means as well. See COUNCIL OF EUROPE, GUIDE ON ARTICLE 6, at 49–50 (2013). 
That a right to information is no guarantee for easy and affordable access is witnessed by 
the electronic access system for federal courts. See Vera Eidelman & Amul Kalia, Right to 
Know: The PACER Mess and How to Clean It, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (Sept. 2, 2014). 
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2014/09/right-know-pacer-mess-and-how-clean-it.  
 108. See, e.g., Stb. 2003, p. 551 [Act on the Central Bureau of Statistics] (Neth.); 
Statistics Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. S-19 (Can.); Statistics and Registration Service Act, 2007, 
c. 18 (U.K.). 
 109. See, e.g., Stb. 2007, p. 153 [Act on Trade Register] (Neth.); Companies Act, 
2006, c. 46 (U.K.); Handelsgesetzbuch [Act on Trade Register], Oct. 23, 2008, BGBL. 
III at 4100-1, § 8 (Ger.).  
 110. Mireille van Eechoud, Commercialization of Public Sector Information: Delineating 
the Issues, in THE FUTURE OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN: IDENTIFYING THE COMMONS IN 
INFORMATION LAW 279, 281–83 (Lucie Guibault & P. Bernt Hugenholtz eds., 2006). 
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for other (administrative) purposes.111 In the interest of research, some 
statistics offices organize secure environments, where researchers can 
access micro-data under strict conditions. While no international legal 
right to (re)use public sector information exists, access to government 
information is increasingly recognized as a human right.112 
B. ACCESS TO INFORMATION NORMS 
Several international courts see access rights as part of, or closely 
connected to, the right to freedom of expression.113 However, access rights 
are also recognized in case law of the European Court of Human Rights in 
 
 111. See CONFERENCE OF EUROPEAN STATISTICIANS, FUNDAMENTAL 
PRINCIPLES OF OFFICIAL STATISTICS (1991). They were since updated and endorsed by 
the U.N. General Assembly. G.A. Res. 68/261, U.N. Doc. A/68/261 (Jan. 29, 2014). 
Principle 6 reads: “Individual data collected by statistical agencies for statistical 
compilation, whether they refer to natural or legal persons, are to be strictly confidential 
and used exclusively for statistical purposes.” Id. There are similar examples at the 
national level. See, e.g., Confidential Information Protection and Statistical Efficiency Act 
of 2002 (CIPSEA), Pub. L. 107-347, 116 Stat. 2962 (2002); Stb. 2003, p. 516 [Dutch 
Statistics Act] (Neth.).  
 112. For an extensive analysis of different human rights based conceptualizations of 
access to government information, see CHERYL A. BISHOP, ACCESS TO INFORMATION 
AS A HUMAN RIGHT (2011).  
 113. A right to access of government information is guaranteed under Article 13 
(Freedom of Thought and Expression) of the American Convention on Human Rights, 
and states have a positive obligation to provide access, subject only to access restrictions 
that are proportionate and for reasons permitted by the Convention. Claude-Reyes et al. 
v. Chile, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 
151, ¶ 77 (Sept. 9, 2006). Refusal to grant access to government information to a public 
watchdog violates the right to freedom of expression under Article 10 of the ECHR. 
Youth Initiative for Human Rights v. Serbia, App. No. 48135/06, Judgment, 2013 Eur. 
Ct. H.R. 584 (2013); ECHR, supra note 67, art. 10. In another case, the European 
Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) conceded it “has recently advanced towards a broader 
interpretation of the notion of ‘freedom to receive information’ and thereby towards the 
recognition of a right of access to information.” TASZ v. Hungary, App. No. 37374/05, 
2009 Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶ 35 (2009). Previously it had rejected the claim that ECHR Article 
10 includes a right to access government information, or a positive obligation for states to 
collect and disseminate information. See, e.g., Guerra v. Italy, App. No. 14967/89, 1998 
Eur. Ct. H.R. 7 (1998).  
  
2096 BERKELEY TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 30:3  
the context of the right to private life.114 By contrast, access rights may be 
conceived of as stand-alone constitutional rights.115 
The Tromsø Convention of the Council of Europe concerns access to 
government information,116 but it is unlikely that enough member states 
will ratify this convention for it to enter into force any time soon.117 Much 
more successful is the U.N. Aarhus Convention of 1998, with nearly fifty 
contracting states.118 The Aarhus Convention provides for a right of access 
to environmental information as part of every citizen’s right to an adequate 
environment and duty to safeguard the environment for future 
generations.119 
A fundamental right of access does not necessarily imply that 
authorities must actively disclose information to the general public in 
electronic form without use-restrictions. But open government agendas do 
steer policy in that direction. At the global level, the Open Government 
Partnership promotes proactive disclosure in reusable formats.120  
In various human rights domains, proactive disclosure is also 
advocated. The U.N. rapporteur on Human Rights typifies the right to 
access government information as “one of the central components of the 
right to freedom of opinion and expression.”121 To give effect to the right 
 
 114. The ECtHR recognized a duty to impart information for the government as 
part of the right to respect for private life (under Article 8 of the ECHR) on various 
occasions: where it concerned access to foster care records, Gaskin v. UK, App. No. 
10454/83, 12 Eur. H.R. Rep. 36 (1989), and with respect to information about 
environmental pollution (threatening citizens’ health), Guerra v. Italy, supra note 113; 
Onderyildiz v. Turkey, 2004-XII Eur. Ct. H.R. 81. In these cases, applicants had a 
special interest. 
 115. For example, Article 42 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European 
Union provides that any citizen of the Union has a right of access to documents held by 
E.U. institutions. E.U. Charter of Fundamental Rights, supra note 68, art. 42. For an in 
depth analysis of access rights of a wider openness agenda, see Alberto Alemanno, 
Unpacking the Principle of Openness in EU Law: Transparency, Participation and Democracy, 
39 EUR. L. REV. 72 (2014).  
 116. Tromsø Convention, Council of Europe Convention on Access to Official 
Documents, opened for signature June 18, 2009, C.E.T.S. No. 205 (not yet ratified). 
 117. Mireille van Eechoud & Katleen Janssen, Rights of Access to Public Sector 
Information, 6 MASARYK U. J.L. & TECH. 471, 486 (2012). 
 118. Aarhus Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-
Making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters, opened for signature June 25, 
1998, 2161 U.N.T.S. 447 (entered into force Oct. 30, 2001). 
 119. Id. 
 120. See Open Government Declaration, OPEN GOVERNMENT PARTNERSHIP, 
http://www.opengovpartnership.org/about/open-government-declaration (last visited 
May 1, 2015). 
 121. Special Rapporteur, Report on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom 
of Opinion and Expression in Accordance with Human Rights Council Resolution 16/4, 
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of access to information under Article Nineteen of the United Nations 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, “parties should proactively put in the public 
domain Government information of public interest” and “make every 
effort to ensure easy, prompt, effective and practical access to such 
information.”122 In 2006, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights 
held that States have a positive obligation to legislate freedom of 
information laws or take other measures that ensure access to government 
information.123 
The adoption rate of freedom of information laws has accelerated on 
all continents over the past decade. Today nearly a hundred countries have 
enacted freedom of information laws.124 Some freedom of information 
laws contain provisions on proactive disclosure of information.125 These 
tend to be vague and rather limited in scope. Traditionally access laws 
focus on disclosure of information on request by a member of the public. 
Access laws detail how requests can be made and how decisions must be 
reached.126 A basic principle in freedom of information acts is that citizens 
do not have to motivate why they want access; the public interest in 
 
transmitted by Note of the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. A/68/362 (Sept. 4, 2013). See also 
Human Rights Council Res. 12/12, Right to the Truth, 12th Sess., Oct. 1, 2009, U.N. 
GAOR, 68th Sess., A/HRC/RES/12/12, at 3 (Oct. 12, 2009) (“the public and 
individuals are entitled to have access, to the fullest extent practicable, to information 
regarding the actions and decision-making processes of their Government, within the 
framework of each State’s domestic legal system”); Inter-American Commission on 
Human Rights [IACHR], The Right to Truth in the Americas, IACHR Doc. OEA/Ser.L/
V/II.152 (Aug. 13, 2014). 
 122. Human Rights Comm. on Article 19: Freedoms of Opinion and Expression, 
General Comment No. 34, Rep. on its 102d Sess., July 11–29, 2011, U.N. Doc. CCPR/
C/GC/34, ¶ 19 (Sept. 12, 2011). 
 123. Claude-Reyes et al. v. Chile, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-
Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 151, ¶¶ 77, 102 (Sept. 9, 2006). 
 124. See Map, GLOBAL RIGHT TO INFORMATION RATING, http://www.rti
-rating.org. 
 125. For an analysis of the drivers of pro-active disclosure of government information 
and its growing enactment in binding norms, see Helen Darbishire, Proactive 
Transparency: The Future of the Right to Information? (World Bank Inst. Governance 
Working Paper Series, No. 56,598, 2010). 
 126. See JONATHAN GRAY & HELEN DARBISHIRE, BEYOND ACCESS: OPEN 
GOVERNMENT DATA & THE RIGHT TO (RE)USE PUBLIC INFORMATION (Creative 
Commons, 2011); Mireille van Eechoud et al., Good Practices Collection on Access to Data, 
LAPSI (July 11, 2014) [hereinafter Good Practices Collection]. 
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disclosure is considered a given.127 A right to access information does not 
necessarily imply that the information can subsequently be used freely.128 
Generally, freedom of information laws do not prescribe how data 
must be made available (for example in an open format, machine readable, 
with a certain frequency).129 Usually, information disclosed under freedom 
of information laws is not required to be legally or technically open.130 It 
is, however, a common feature that public bodies must, wherever possible, 
respect the mode of supply preferred by the requesting party, if the 
documents are available in such form or easily so produced.131 Freedom of 
information laws usually contain privacy provisions, as discussed next. 
C. ACCESS TO INFORMATION NORMS AND PRIVACY 
Machine readable, bulk-downloadable open data complicate a problem 
that was already a difficult one in the pre-digital era. Since at least the 
1970s, countries have grappled with the problem of balancing privacy 
protection and public sector transparency.132 Generic freedom of 
information laws typically aim to accommodate privacy interests, for 
example by reserving access to personal information to parties with 
particular interests, or by only making records available in secure reading 
rooms.  
Two balancing models regarding privacy and transparency can be 
distinguished in freedom of information laws. First, sometimes privacy is 
an absolute limitation to disclosure. That is, the legislator has done the 
balancing ex-ante. For example, the Dutch Freedom of Information Act 
provides that certain types of sensitive personal data (for example data 
concerning medical matters or religion) may never be disclosed.133  
 
 127. GRAY & DARBISHIRE, supra note 126; Good Practices Collection, supra note 126.  
 128. For instance, before implementation of the E.U. Public Sector Information 
Directive, the Belgian federal freedom of information act stipulated that no commercial 
use was allowed of information obtained under the act. See Wet betreffende de 
openbaarheid van bestuur of Apr. 11, 1994, BELGISCH STAATSBLAD [B.S.] [Official 
Gazette of Belgium], June 30, 1994 (deleted by Act N. 2007-1600, Mar. 7, 2007). 
 129. See the analysis of over forty freedom of information acts, GRAY & 
DARBISHIRE, supra note 126; Good Practices Collection, supra note 126.  
 130. GRAY & DARBISHIRE, supra note 126. 
 131. See, e.g., Aarhus Convention of 1998, supra note 118, art. 4. 
 132. For instance, in 1973 Sweden adopted its data privacy law partly to ensure that 
the generous Swedish regime for access to official documents, which dates back to 1776, 
would not unduly interfere with privacy. See GLORIA GONZÁLEZ FUSTER, THE 
EMERGENCE OF PERSONAL DATA PROTECTION AS A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT OF THE 
EU 59 (2014).  
 133. Wet openbaarheid van bestuur [Dutch Freedom of Information Act], Stb. 1991, 
art. 10(1)d (Neth.). 
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Second, sometimes freedom of information laws include a relative 
privacy exemption, to be weighed against the public interest in disclosure 
on a case-by-case basis.134 U.S. freedom of information law exempts 
disclosure of personal, medical and similar files.135 The test is whether 
disclosure “would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal 
privacy.”136 Personal information gathered as part of law enforcement is 
also exempt, if disclosure “could reasonably be expected to constitute an 
unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.”137 If privacy interests prevent 
disclosure, it is common for freedom of information laws to demand that 
exempted information is redacted so that the remainder can be released, 
even if cleaning documents is labor intensive.138 
The regulation that governs access to documents from E.U. 
institutions (such as the Council of Ministers, Parliament, and 
Commission) stipulates that access to a document shall be refused if 
“disclosure would undermine the protection of privacy . . . in particular in 
accordance with Community legislation regarding the protection of 
personal data.”139 The Obama Freedom of Information Memorandum 
states: “In the face of doubt, openness prevails.”140  
At global human rights forums, the presumption is that the public 
interest in access to public sector information (as part of the freedom of 
expression) trumps privacy and other interests. Human rights rapporteurs 
for the United Nations argue that access to information should be granted 
unless disclosure would cause serious harm to a protected interest such as 
 
 134. The Dutch Freedom of Information Act provides such a relative ground for 
non-disclosure, where the public’s right to know does not outweigh a person’s interest to 
have his or her private sphere protected. Id., art. 10(2)e. 
 135. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6) (2012) (known as Exemption 6 of Electronic Freedom of 
Information Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 104-231, 110 Stat. 3048).  
 136. Id. 
 137. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7). 
 138. For example, Article 4(4) of the Aarhus Convention exempts the release of 
personal data (if confidential under domestic law); Article 4(6) obliges states to redact the 
documents. Aarhus Convention of 1998, supra note 118, art. 4. 
 139. Council Regulation 1049/2001, art. 4, 2001 O.J. (L 145) 43. The way the 
institutions have interpreted this limitation is controversial; the European Ombudsman 
and the European Data Protection Supervisor signal overzealous interpretation of the 
rules on data protection as a threat to transparency. How the scales tip thus depends as 
much on the prevailing culture of transparency (or secrecy) as on the black letter. See H. 
R. KRANENBORG, TOEGANG TOT DOCUMENTEN EN BESCHERMING VAN 
PERSOONSGEGEVENS IN DE EUROPESE UNIE [ACCESS TO DOCUMENTS AND DATA 
PROTECTION IN THE EUROPEAN UNION] 188–94 (2007). 
 140. See President Barack Obama, Memorandum, Freedom of Information Act, 74 
Fed. Reg. 15 (Jan. 21, 2009). 
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privacy that outweighs the interest in disclosure.141 The rapporteurs also 
stress the importance of proactive disclosure obligations, and posit that 
“access to information law should, to the extent of any inconsistency, 
prevail over other legislation.”142  
Particularly for the disclosure in the interest of political accountability 
and public debate, judgments in which the right to freedom of expression 
and the right to privacy are balanced can give guidance. The European 
Court of Human Rights recognizes the importance of proactive release of 
data on the Internet as a means to ensure effective transparency and 
accountability. In the Wypych case, the Court rejected the claim by an 
elected local councilor who argued that by requiring him to disclose 
information on his financial interests online, the Polish legislature 
infringed his right to privacy under Article 8 of the European Convention 
on Human Rights. The Court noted “[t]he general public has a legitimate 
interest in ascertaining that local politics are transparent and Internet 
access to the declarations makes access to such information effective and 
easy. Without such access, the obligation would have no practical 
importance or genuine incidence on the degree to which the public is 
informed about the political process.”143  
Earlier, the European Court of Human Rights held that the privacy 
interests of politicians and higher public officials must yield to access 
rights.144 The Court considered “that it would be fatal for freedom of 
expression in the sphere of politics if public figures could censor the press 
and public debate in the name of their personality rights, alleging that 
their opinions on public matters are related to their person and therefore 
constitute private data which cannot be disclosed without consent.”145  
 
 141. See, e.g., AMBEYI LIGABO, U.N. SPECIAL RAPPORTEUS ON FREEDOM OF 
OPINION AND EXPRESSION ET AL., JOINT DECLARATION, INTERNATIONAL 
MECHANISMS FOR PROMOTING FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION (2006) [hereinafter JOINT 
DECLARATION, PROMOTING FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION (2006)] (signed by the U.N. 
Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Opinion and Expression, the OSCE Representative 
on Freedom of the Media, the OAS Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression and 
the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights). See also JOINT 
DECLARATION, INTERNATIONAL MECHANISMS FOR PROMOTING FREEDOM OF 
EXPRESSION (2004) [hereinafter JOINT DECLARATION, PROMOTING FREEDOM OF 
EXPRESSION (2004)]. 
 142. See, e.g., JOINT DECLARATION, PROMOTING FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 
(2004), supra note 141. 
 143. Wypych v. Poland, App. No. 2428/05, 2005 Eur. Ct. H.R. (admissibility 
decision). 
 144. TASZ v. Hungary, supra note 113, ¶ 37. 
 145. TASZ v. Hungary, supra note 113, ¶ 37. 
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In conclusion, regulation and case law regarding freedom of public 
sector information can provide inspiration on how to strike the balance 
between privacy and transparency in the open data context. Apart from 
that, there are more general principles to balance privacy-related interests 
and other interests. We turn to those Fair Information Principles now.  
IV. GOVERNANCE OF PERSONAL INFORMATION 
The Fair Information Principles (FIPs) provide a framework to 
balance privacy and other interests. Below we give an introduction to the 
FIPs, and to the OECD Privacy Guidelines, which include a version of 
the FIPs. We also discuss the main challenges when reconciling the FIPs 
and open data policy.  
A. FAIR INFORMATION PRINCIPLES (FIPS)  
1. Background of the FIPs 
The Fair Information Principles (FIPs),146 or the Fair Information 
Practice Principles (FIPPs),147 are ingrained in most data privacy laws and 
guidelines around the world. For example, the FIPs can be recognized in 
the 1973 report Records, Computers, and the Rights of Citizens, by the U.S. 
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare;148 the Privacy Act;149 and 
the Fair Credit Reporting Act.150 The Federal Trade Commission and the 
White House have recently called for FIPs-based privacy regulation for 
the private sector.151 
 
 146. See NEIL RICHARDS, INTELLECTUAL PRIVACY: RETHINKING CIVIL 
LIBERTIES IN THE DIGITAL AGE 162 (2014) See also Robert Gellman, Fair Information 
Practices: A Basic History, Version 2.02, BOBGELLMAN.COM (2013), 
http://bobgellman.com/rg-docs/rg-FIPShistory.pdf. 
 147. See The Fair Information Principles at Work, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND 
SECURITY, http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/privacy/dhsprivacy_fippsfactsheet.pdf. 
 148. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH, EDUC. & WELFARE, RECORDS, COMPUTERS, AND 
THE RIGHTS OF CITIZENS, at i, xx (1973), http://www.justice.gov/opcl/docs/rec-com-
rights.pdf. 
 149. Privacy Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-579, 88 Stat. 1896 (codified at 5 U.S.C. 
§ 552a (2012)). 
 150. Fair Credit Reporting Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-508, 84 Stat. 1128 (codified 
as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681–1681x (2012)). 
 151. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, CONSUMER DATA PRIVACY IN A NETWORKED 
WORLD (2012), http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/privacy-final.pdf; FEDERAL 
TRADE COMMISSION, PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY IN AN ERA OF RAPID 
CHANGE: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR BUSINESSES AND POLICYMAKERS (2012), 
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/federal-trade-commission-report
-protecting-consumer-privacy-era-rapid-change-recommendations/120326privacyreport.pdf. 
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About a hundred countries in the world have a data privacy law 
including a version of the FIPs.152 The FIPs can also be recognized in the 
United Nations Guidelines for the Regulation of Computerized Personal 
Data Files 1990,153 and the APEC Privacy Framework of the Asia-Pacific 
Economic Cooperation (2005).154 The E.U. Data Protection Directive 
(1995) contains one of the world’s most stringent implementations of the 
FIPs.155 European legal scholars tend to speak of data protection principles 
rather than of FIPs, but both sets of principles are similar.156 Different 
countries, however, implement the FIPs differently. The FIPs give 
guidelines to balance privacy-related interests and other interests, such as 
those of business and the public sector.157  
2. OECD Guidelines 
An influential version of the FIPs can be found in the Guidelines 
Governing the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data, 
from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD).158 The OECD was established in 1960, by eighteen European 
countries, the United States, and Canada.159 Now, the OECD has thirty-
 
 152. Graham Greenleaf, Sheherezade and the 101 Data Privacy Laws: Origins, 
Significance and Global Trajectories, 23 J.L. INFO. & SCI. 4 (2014); GRAHAM 
GREENLEAF, GLOBAL TABLES OF DATA PRIVACY LAWS AND BILLS (3d ed. 2013), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2280875. 
 153. Guidelines for the Regulation of Computerized Personal Data Files, G.A. RES. 
45/95, U.N. DOC. A/RES/45/95 (Dec. 14, 1990).  
 154. Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation [APEC], Privacy Framework, APEC Doc. 
No. 205-SO-01.2 (2005), http://www.apec.org/Groups/Committee-on-Trade-and-
Investment/~/media/Files/Groups/ECSG/05_ecsg_privacyframewk.ashx. 
 155. Directive 95/46/EC, supra note 69.  
 156. The core of E.U. data protection law can be found in article 6 of the Data 
Protection Directive. Directive 95/46/EC, supra note 69, art. 6.  
 157. Paul de Hert & Serge Gutwirth, Privacy, Data Protection and Law Enforcement: 
Opacity of the Individual and Transparency of Power, in PRIVACY AND THE CRIMINAL 
LAW 91 (Erik Claes, Antony Duff, & Serge Gutwirth eds., 2006); see also RICHARDS, 
supra note 146, at 162; Marc Rotenberg, Fair Information Practices and the Architecture of 
Privacy (What Larry Doesn’t Get), 2001 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 1, 1–4; Ann Cavoukian, 
Evolving FIPPs: Proactive Approaches to Privacy, Not Privacy Paternalism, in REFORMING 
EUROPEAN DATA PROTECTION LAW 293 (Serge Gutwirth, Ronald Leenes & Paul de 
Hert eds., 2015). 
 158.  OECD Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal 
Data, OECD, http://www.oecd.org/sti/ieconomy/oecdguidelinesontheprotectionofprivac
yandtransborderflowsofpersonaldata.htm (last visited June 22, 2015) [hereinafter OECD 
Privacy Guidelines]. The OECD Privacy Guidelines call these principles “Basic 
Principles of National Application.” 
 159. Robert Wolfe, From Reconstructing Europe to Constructing Globalization: The 
OECD in Historical Perspective, in THE OECD AND TRANSNATIONAL GOVERNANCE 
25, 25–26 (Rianne Mahon & Stephen McBride eds., 2008). 
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four member countries, including Mexico, Chile, Korea and Japan.160 The 
OECD’s self-stated mission is “to promote policies that will improve the 
economic and social well-being of people around the world.”161  
One of the main reasons for the OECD to adopt the Guidelines was 
that several European data privacy laws from the 1970s restricted the 
export of personal data to countries that offered inadequate legal 
protection to personal data. Some, the United States in particular, worried 
that European countries would use data privacy law as a trade barrier.162 
The chairman of the expert group that wrote the 1980 OECD Guidelines 
summarized, “the OECD’s central concern was . . . that the response of 
European nations (and European regional institutions) to the challenges 
of TBDF [transborder data flows] for privacy might potentially erect legal 
and economic barriers against which it was essential to provide effective 
exceptions.”163 Therefore, OECD member states negotiated about more 
international cooperation, leading to the adoption of the Privacy 
Guidelines in 1980.164 
The OECD Guidelines have a dual goal: they aim to protect privacy 
and individual liberties, and to foster the free flow of information between 
OECD member countries.165 Many legal data privacy instruments have a 
similar dual goal.166 In this Article we focus on protecting privacy and 
individual liberties, rather than on transborder data flows.167  
The Guidelines are not legally binding, they merely “recommend” that 
OECD member countries implement the Guidelines.168 The Guidelines 
 
 160.  Members and Partners, OECD, http://www.oecd.org/about/membersand
partners (last visited June 22, 2015). 
 161. About the OCED, OECD, http://www.oecd.org/about (last visited June 22, 
2015). 
 162. Nicholas Platten, Background to and History of the Directive, in EC DATA 
PROTECTION DIRECTIVE 15 (David Bainbridge ed., 1996); GONZÁLEZ FUSTER, supra 
note 132, at 77.  
 163. Michael Kirby, The History, Achievement and Future of the 1980 OECD 
Guidelines on Privacy, 20 J.L. INFO. & SCI. 1, 6 (2010).  
 164. Id. at 7–10. 
 165. OECD Privacy Guidelines, supra note 158. 
 166. See GONZÁLEZ FUSTER, supra note 132, at 130. For instance, the E.U. Data 
Protection Directive has a similar dual goal. See Directive 95/46/EC, supra note 69, art. 1. 
 167. On transborder data flows, see CHRISTOPHER KUNER, TRANSBORDER DATA 
FLOWS AND DATA PRIVACY LAW (2013). 
 168. OECD, Recommendation of the Council Concerning Guidelines Governing the 
Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data, at 11–12, C(80)58/FINAL 
(2013), http://www.oecd.org/sti/ieconomy/2013-oecd-privacy-guidelines.pdf (as amended 
on July 11, 2013). 
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stress that they provide “minimum standards”169 and do not “preven[t] the 
application of different protective measures to different categories of 
personal data, depending upon their nature and the context in which they 
are collected, stored, processed or disseminated.”170 The OECD 
Guidelines use flexible terms so that all of the member countries can agree 
with them, even though the United States and European countries have 
different legal traditions, especially regarding privacy and personal data.171  
When the OECD Guidelines were adopted in 1980, only about one 
third of the member states had adopted a data privacy law. Now, almost 
every OECD member state has a data privacy law with the FIPs at its 
core.172 The OECD Guidelines were updated in 2013, but the essence of 
the principles was retained.173 The 2013 OECD Privacy Guidelines are 
listed below. The principles partly overlap, and should be read together:  
Collection Limitation Principle 
There should be limits to the collection of personal data and 
any such data should be obtained by lawful and fair means 
and, where appropriate, with the knowledge or consent of 
the data subject.174 
Data Quality Principle 
Personal data should be relevant to the purposes for which 
they are to be used, and, to the extent necessary for those 
purposes, should be accurate, complete and kept up-to-
date.175 
Purpose Specification Principle 
The purposes for which personal data are collected should be 
specified not later than at the time of data collection and the 
subsequent use limited to the fulfilment of those purposes or 
such others as are not incompatible with those purposes and 
as are specified on each occasion of change of purpose.176 
 
 169. Id. at 14.  
 170. Id. at 13. 
 171. Kirby, supra note 163, at 10.  
 172. David Wright, Paul de Hert, & Serge Gutwirth, Are the OECD Guidelines at 30 
Showing Their Age?, 54 COMMUNICATIONS OF THE ACM 119, 122 (2011). 
 173. OECD, THE OECD PRIVACY FRAMEWORK 4, http://www.oecd.org/sti/
ieconomy/oecd_privacy_framework.pdf (last visited June 22, 2015) (“[T]his revision 
leaves intact the original ‘Basic Principles’ in Part Two of the Guidelines.”). 
 174. Id. at 14 (paragraph 7 of the Guidelines governs the protection of privacy and 
transborder flows of personal data).  
 175. Id.   
 176. Id.  
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Use Limitation Principle 
Personal data should not be disclosed, made available or 
otherwise used for purposes other than those specified in 
accordance with [the Purpose Specification Principle] 
except: 
a) with the consent of the data subject; or 
b) by the authority of law.177 
Security Safeguards Principle 
Personal data should be protected by reasonable security 
safeguards against such risks as loss or unauthorised access, 
destruction, use, modification or disclosure of data.178 
Openness Principle 
There should be a general policy of openness about 
developments, practices and policies with respect to personal 
data. Means should be readily available of establishing the 
existence and nature of personal data, and the main purposes 
of their use, as well as the identity and usual residence of the 
data controller.179 
Individual Participation Principle 
Individuals should have the right: 
a) to obtain from a data controller, or otherwise, 
confirmation of whether or not the data controller has 
data relating to them; 
b) to have communicated to them, data relating to them 
(i) within a reasonable time; 
(ii) at a charge, if any, that is not excessive; 
(iii) in a reasonable manner; and 
(iv) in a form that is readily intelligible to them; 
c) to be given reasons if a request made under 
subparagraphs (a) and (b) is denied, and to be able to 
challenge such denial; and 
d) to challenge data relating to them and, if the 
challenge is successful to have the data erased, rectified, 
completed or amended.180 
 
 177. Id.  
 178. Id. at 15.  
 179. Id.  
 180. Id.   
  
2106 BERKELEY TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 30:3  
Accountability Principle 
A data controller should be accountable for complying with 
measures which give effect to the principles stated above.181 
3. Scope of the OECD Guidelines 
The OECD Guidelines apply to “personal data,” which the Guidelines 
define as “any information relating to an identified or identifiable 
individual (data subject).”182 But the Guidelines limit the scope of 
application considerably; they “apply to personal data, whether in the 
public or private sectors, which, because of the manner in which they are 
processed, or because of their nature or the context in which they are used, pose a 
risk to privacy and individual liberties.”183  
The Guidelines thus follow a risk-based approach: they only apply to 
personal data processing if it threatens privacy or individual liberties. By 
contrast, E.U. data protection law generally applies to personal data 
processing, and requires that personal data be processed fairly, including 
when the data do not pose a prima facie risk for individual liberties.184  
In this Article, we assume that personal data should always be handled 
in line with the FIPs.185 Hence, we do not follow the risk-based approach 
suggested by the OECD Guidelines. We do consider the risk of personal 
data processing and the sensitivity of personal data, but we do so within 
the FIPs framework (see infra Parts V–VII).  
The OECD Guidelines have been criticized, for instance, for 
implementing the FIPs too weakly. Roger Clarke says the OECD 
Guidelines aim “to facilitate international business, not to protect 
privacy.”186 The OECD Guidelines “were motivated by the facilitation of 
 
 181. Id.  
 182. Id. at 13. The OECD personal data definition is similar to the definition in 
E.U. data protection law. Directive 95/46/EC, supra note 69, art. 2(a). 
 183. OECD PRIVACY FRAMEWORK, supra note 173, at 14 (emphasis added). 
 184. See E.U. Charter of Fundamental Rights, supra note 68, art. 8 (“1. Everyone has 
the right to the protection of personal data concerning him or her. 2. Such data must be 
processed fairly for specified purposes and on the basis of the consent of the person 
concerned or some other legitimate basis laid down by law.”); see also Case C-131/12, 
Google Inc. v Agencia Española de Protección de Datos (AEPD), 2014 EUR-Lex 
CELEX LEXIS 0131 ¶ 69 (May 13, 2014) (CJEU); Joined Cases 293 & 594/12, Digital 
Rights Ireland Ltd v Minister for Communications, Marine and Natural Resources, 
Kärntner Landesregierung, 2014 EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS 0293 ¶ 36 (Apr. 8, 2014) 
(CJEU). 
 185. The idea that personal data should always be processed in line with the FIPs 
could be seen as a European approach. 
 186. Roger Clarke, Research Use of Personal Data, Comments at the National 
Scholarly Communications Forum on Privacy: Balancing the Needs of Researchers and 
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international business; they were constrained by the need to leave existing 
legislation unaffected; and their formulation reflected the need for cross-
cultural comprehensibility.”187  
For better or for worse, the FIPs are widely accepted as a starting point 
for data privacy law. Although the application of the FIPs varies 
considerably, they express a nearly worldwide consensus on minimum 
standards for fair personal data use. The next section describes the main 
challenges that arise when trying to reconcile the FIPs and open data 
policy. 
B. FIPS AND OPEN DATA: CHALLENGES  
To date, policymakers and academics have given limited attention to 
the question of how privacy norms might be reconciled with policies 
aimed at making government data available for a wide range of uses. 
Policymakers and civil society actors recognize the privacy implications of 
open data.188 But detailed analyses of the tension between open data and 
privacy, and especially of open data and the FIPs, is scarce. In the 
empirical mapping study, we found that, while there were some mentions 
of open data and privacy together on various forms of digital media, many 
of these were fleeting or incidental, and few of them contained substantive 
discussion about how to achieve a balance between the two.189 
Several open data guidelines from civil society mention privacy—albeit 
cursorily. For example, the 8 Principles of Open Government Data state that 
“[r]easonable privacy, security and privilege restrictions may be allowed.”190 
The Sunlight Foundation says that for a dataset to be open, “[a]ll raw 
information from [the] dataset should be released to the public, except to 
 
the Individual’s Right to Privacy under the New Privacy Laws (Aug. 9, 2002), 
http://www.rogerclarke.com/DV/NSCF02.html; see also William Bonner & Mike 
Chiasson, If Fair Information Principles Are the Answer, What Was the Question? An Actor-
Network Theory Investigation of the Modern Constitution of Privacy, 15 INFO. & ORG. 267, 
284 (2005).  
 187. Roger Clarke, Beyond the OECD Guidelines: Privacy Protection for the 21st 
Century (Jan. 4, 2000), http://www.rogerclarke.com/DV/PP21C.html. 
 188. For example, the United Kingdom’s Open Rights Group expressed concern over 
the U.K. government’s plans to release anonymized health and education data. See Open 
Data Privacy, OPEN RIGHTS GROUP, https://www.openrightsgroup.org/campaigns/
opendata/open-data-privacy (last visited June 22, 2015). The Open Knowledge and the 
Open Rights Group convened a working group on open data, personal data, and privacy. 
See PERSONAL DATA & PRIVACY WORKING GROUP, http://personal-data.okfn.org/ 
(last visited June 22, 2015). 
 189. MAPPING THE POLITICS OF OPEN DATA, supra note 62. 
 190. 8 Principles of Open Government Data, PUBLIC.RESOURCE.ORG (Dec. 8, 2007), 
https://public.resource.org/8_principles.html. 
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the extent necessary to comply with federal law regarding the release of 
personally identifiable information.”191 
In the open data context, governmental and intergovernmental bodies 
also mention protecting privacy, albeit in a cursory fashion. For example, 
the G8 Open Data Charter recognizes that “there is national and 
international legislation, in particular pertaining to intellectual property, 
personally-identifiable and sensitive information, which must be 
observed.”192 The 2008 OECD recommendation on public sector 
information urges that member countries should clearly define “grounds of 
refusal or limitations,” including “personal privacy.”193 
Compared to the OECD’s recommendation, the implementation 
guidance material for Obama’s 2013 executive order contains a more 
substantive discussion of privacy and the Fair Information Principles. The 
memorandum includes the suggestion to “[s]trengthen measures to ensure 
that privacy and confidentiality are fully protected and that data are 
properly secured[,]” and to “incorporate privacy analyses into each stage of 
the information’s life cycle.”194 As well as demanding compliance with 
relevant laws such as the U.S. Privacy Act of 1974 and the E-Government 
Act of 2002, the memorandum suggests that “agencies should implement 
information policies based upon Fair Information Practice Principles and 
NIST guidance on Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information 
Systems and Organizations.”195 
In the European Union, some work has been done on reconciling 
privacy and open data, in a thematic network funded by the European 
Commission to reflect on Legal Aspects of Public Sector Information 
(LAPSI). The LAPSI Working Group on privacy warns that full 
application of European data privacy rules will seriously hamper the ability 
of public sector bodies to disclose information for re-use purposes.196 In 
the following section, we discuss the main challenges that occur when 
trying to reconcile the FIPs and open data policy, starting with the 
purpose specification principle. 
 
 191. SUNLIGHT FOUNDATION, supra note 12. 
 192. G8 OPEN DATA CHARTER, supra note 1.  
 193. OECD Recommendation, supra note 19, at 5.  
 194. OMB MEMORANDUM M-13-13, OPEN DATA POLICY, supra note 25, at 9. 
 195. Id. 
 196. Dos Santos et al., supra note 8, at 348–49; see also van Eechoud et al., LAPSI 
Position Paper, supra note 8.  
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1. Purpose Specif ication Principle 
The main problem that occurs when trying to reconcile the FIPs and 
open data policy is that open data policy fosters unanticipated re-use and 
innovation—“serendipitous reuse” as Shadbolt et al. put it.197 But 
secondary use of personal data brings privacy risks. In FIPs parlance, using 
personal information for unforeseen purposes may breach the purpose 
specification principle. 
The purpose specification principle is a cornerstone of many data 
privacy laws in the world. It follows from the purpose principle that 
personal data should only be collected for a purpose that is specified in 
advance, and that those data should not be used for incompatible 
purposes.198 The 1973 “Records, Computers, and the Rights of Citizens” 
report from the U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare 
already contained a similar principle: “[t]here must be a way for an 
individual to prevent information about him that was obtained for one 
purpose from being used or made available for other purposes without his 
consent.”199 In the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European 
Union, the purpose specification is included in the right to protection of 
personal data.200 
The requirement that personal data may only be used for purposes that 
are “not incompatible” is somewhat vague. The Article 29 Working Party, 
an advisory body in which national data protection authorities from 
Europe cooperate,201 has discussed the purpose specification in depth. To 
 
 197. Nigel Shadbolt, Wendy Hall & Tim Berners-Lee, The Semantic Web Revisited, 
21 IEEE INTELLIGENT SYSTEMS 96, 98 (2006); see also WENDY HALL ET AL., 
NOMINET TRUST, OPEN DATA AND CHARITIES 16 (2012), http://www.nominettrust
.org.uk/sites/default/files/Open%20Data%20and%20Charities.pdf (“Open data, taking 
inspiration from other ideologies of openness such as open source and open access 
publishing, articulates the idea that data should be usable by anyone, not just the data 
owner (or ‘data controller’ in the language of the Data Protection Act).”). 
 198. See the Purpose Specification Principle from the OECD Guidelines, supra 
Section IV.A.2. 
 199. RECORDS, COMPUTERS, AND THE RIGHTS OF CITIZENS, supra note 148, at 
xx.  
 200. E.U. Charter of Fundamental Rights, supra note 68, art. 8(2). 
 201. On the Working Party generally, see Yves Poullet & Serge Gutwirth, The 
Contribution of the Article 29 Working Party to the Construction of a Harmonised European 
Data Protection System: An Illustration of “Reflexive Governance”?, in DÉFIS DU DROIT À 
LA PROTECTION DE LA VIE PRIVÉE [CHALLENGES OF PRIVACY AND DATA 
PROTECTION LAW] 570 (María Verónica Perez Asinari & Pablo Palazzi eds., 2008). 
The Working Party’s opinions are not legally binding, but they are influential in Europe. 
Judges and national Data Protection Authorities often follow the Working Party’s 
interpretation. 
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assess whether a new purpose is compatible with the collection purpose, 
says the Working Party, all circumstances must be considered. Relevant 
circumstances include the relation between the original and the new 
purpose, the collection context, the reasonable expectations of the data 
subject,202 the personal data’s sensitivity, the risks resulting from the new 
purpose, and the measures the controller has in place to mitigate risks.203  
According to the Working Party, an example of a new purpose that is 
incompatible with the original processing purpose is contained in the 
following hypothetical. A public sector body publishes public servants’ 
contact details on its website, to enable the public to contact them.204 A re-
user wants to merge the public servants’ home addresses and phone 
numbers with the published contact details, to build an interactive map.205 
The re-use is not within the reasonable expectations of the civil servants, 
making the purpose incompatible and thus not allowed.206 
2. Security and Accountability Principles 
The security principle requires appropriate security for personal data. 
Data controllers must protect data against unauthorized disclosure, access, 
or other use. When thoughtlessly releasing personal data, a public sector 
body breaches the security principle. After all, the public sector body 
would have no control over how the data are used—and neither would the 
data subjects. The mere fact that data subjects have no control over the use 
of their data is a subjective privacy harm. Moreover, anybody could access 
the data, including data brokers and identity thieves. 
The accountability principle makes the data controller responsible for 
complying with the FIPs. The OECD Guidelines define the data 
controller as the party that “is competent to decide about the contents and 
use of personal data regardless of whether or not such data are collected, 
stored, processed or disseminated by that party or by an agent on its 
 
 202. In the United States and the European Union, the “reasonable expectation of 
privacy” is interpreted differently. The European Court of Human Rights says a “person’s 
reasonable expectations as to privacy is a significant though not necessarily conclusive 
factor.” Perry v. United Kingdom, 2003-IX Eur. Ct. H.R. 141, ¶ 37. On the United 
States, see SOLOVE & SCHWARTZ, supra note 66, at 288–335.  
 203. Opinion of the Article 29 Data Protection Working Party on Open Data and Public 
Sector Information (“PSI”) Re-use, at 20, 1021/00/EN WP 207 (June 5, 2013) [hereinafter 
Article 29 Opinion on Open Data and PSI Re-use]; see also Opinion of the Article 29 Data 
Protection Working Party on Purpose Limitation, 00569/13/EN WP 203 (Apr. 2, 2013).  
 204. Article 29 Opinion on Open Data and PSI Re-use, supra note 203, at 20. 
 205. Id. 
 206. Id. 
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behalf.”207 A public sector body holding the personal data is usually the 
data controller. If a re-user obtains personal data from the public sector 
body, the re-user typically becomes a data controller as well. 
3. Data Quality Principle 
The data quality principle requires appropriate accuracy, completeness, 
and relevancy of personal data. One of the aims of the principle is to 
reduce the risk that organizations base decisions about people on incorrect 
data. Decisions based on incorrect data can have disastrous effects for a 
data subject.208 The data quality principle is relevant to open data. 
Releasing incorrect personal data could have a detrimental effect.209 For 
example, imagine that a website about political campaign financing 
erroneously includes your name as a donor to a fringe extremist party. 
4. Collection Limitation and Transparency Principle 
The transparency principle, or openness principle, requires 
transparency regarding data processing, especially towards the data 
subject.210 The transparency principle aims to prevent data controllers from 
abusing information asymmetry. 
The transparency principle is prominent in data privacy laws, and can 
be recognized, for instance, in the proposed U.S. Consumer Privacy Bill of 
Rights,211 the E.U. Data Protection Directive,212 and the proposed E.U. 
Data Protection Regulation.213 Some authors suggest that the transparency 
 
 207. OECD Privacy Guidelines, supra note 158, art. 1. The OECD data controller 
concept is different from the E.U. concept of “data controller.” In brief, under E.U. data 
protection law, the data controller is the party that determines the goals and means for 
personal data processing. A party that processes personal data on behalf of the controller 
is the “data processor.” Directive 95/46/EC, supra note 69, art. 2(d)–(e).  
 208. See, e.g., Romet v. Netherlands, Eur. Ct. H.R. No. 7094/06 (2012). 
 209. See Scassa, supra note 71; Rotenberg, supra note 157. 
 210. To avoid confusion with the open character of open data, we will speak of the 
“transparency principle” rather than of the “openness principle.” 
 211. CONSUMER DATA PRIVACY IN A NETWORKED WORLD, supra note 151, at 47 
(discussing the Consumer Privacy Bill of Rights and transparency principle). 
 212. Directive 95/46/EC, supra note 69, arts. 10, 11. 
 213. Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the 
Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free 
Movement of Such Data (General Data Protection Regulation), art. 5(a), COM (2012) 11 
final (Jan. 25, 2012). In December 2015, agreement was reached on the Regulation’s text. 
See Regulation (EU) No. XXX/2016 of the European Parliament and of the Council on the 
Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free 
Movement of Such Data (General Data Protection Regulation), COM (2016) 15039/15 
limite (Dec. 15, 2015), http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-15039-2015
-INIT/en/pdf. At the time of writing, the European Parliament and the Council must 
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principle is the most important principle of the FIPs.214 The transparency 
principle has old roots. The first principle of the U.S. Department of 
Health, Education, and Welfare report of 1973 states “[t]here must be no 
personal-data record-keeping systems whose very existence is secret.”215 
The second principle adds that “[t]here must be a way for an individual to 
find out what information about him is in a record and how it is used.”216  
The collection limitation principle requires that personal data, where 
appropriate, be collected with the data subject’s knowledge or consent. 
The Article 29 Working Party recommends that a public sector body 
inform data subjects in advance whether the personal data they provide 
might be disclosed, for example due to freedom of information laws.217  
5. Use Limitation and Individual Participation Principle 
The individual participation principle aims to give people some control 
over the processing of their personal data. For instance, data subjects have 
the right, under certain circumstances, to rectify their data. The principle 
illustrates that the privacy as control perspective has influenced the 
FIPs.218  
As previously stated, unrestricted re-use of personal data would breach 
the purpose specification principle—but the use limitation principle seems 
to offer a way out. The use limitation principle says that personal data 
should only be used in accordance with the purpose specification principle, 
except “a) with the consent of the data subject; or b) by the authority of 
law.”219 Hence, personal data can be used for a new (prima facie 
incompatible) purpose if the data subject consents to the new use. Indeed, 
some have suggested that public sector bodies should obtain consent of the 
relevant individuals before releasing data as open data.220  
 
still formally adopt the final text. The Regulation is expected to become applicable in 
2018. 
 214. See, e.g., de Hert & Gutwirth, supra note 157; ZUIDERVEEN BORGESIUS, 
IMPROVING PRIVACY PROTECTION, supra note 73, at 99, 106–11. 
 215. RECORDS, COMPUTERS, AND THE RIGHTS OF CITIZENS, supra note 148, at 41.  
 216. Id.  
 217. Article 29 Opinion on Open Data and PSI Re-use, supra note 203, at 9. Arvind 
Narayanan et al. suggest that people should be informed regarding re-identification risks. 
ARVIND NARAYANAN, JOANNA HUEY & EDWARD W. FELTEN, A PRECAUTIONARY 
APPROACH TO BIG DATA PRIVACY 1, 16 (2015). 
 218. See Kirby, supra note 163, at 8 (citing Alan Westin as an influence on the 
OECD Guidelines). 
 219. OECD PRIVACY FRAMEWORK, supra note 173, ¶ 10 (Use Limitation 
Principle). 
 220. See, e.g., Bart van der Sloot, On the Fabrication of Sausages, or of Open Government 
and Private Data 3 JeDEM 1, 14 (2011). 
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However, relying on data subject consent for disclosing personal data 
as open data has some drawbacks. First, people are often in a dependent 
position vis-à-vis the public sector, and that position may make consent 
involuntary. Somebody interacting with the public sector might not feel 
free to withhold consent. Say Alice goes to a city council office for 
unemployment benefits. Alice really needs money, as she has missed five 
rent payments, and risks being evicted with her young child. Because she 
wants to be cooperative, Alice is unlikely to withhold consent to any 
request by the city council office. Under E.U. data privacy law, consent 
given under too much pressure is invalid, because consent must be “freely 
given.”221 For instance, if an employer asks an employee for consent, the 
consent might not be freely given because of the power imbalance.222 And 
according to the European Court of Justice, people applying for passports 
cannot be deemed to have freely consented to have their fingerprints 
taken, because people need a passport.223  
A second problem with data subject consent as a justification for 
disclosing personal data is that a request for consent can only be 
meaningful if it specifies a processing purpose.224 A third problem is that 
behavioral studies cast doubt on individual consent as a privacy protection 
measure. For example, on the Internet, people tend to click “I agree” to 
requests that they see on their screens without knowing what they are 
agreeing to.225 Furthermore, it may be impractical for the public sector 
body to obtain the consent of thousands of individuals. In sum, obtaining 
data subjects’ consent to release personal data is not a general solution to 
reconcile FIPs and open data policy.  
To conclude, from a FIPs perspective, the main problem with open 
data is that it can be used by anyone, for any purpose, without re-use 
 
 221. ELENI KOSTA, CONSENT IN EUROPEAN DATA PROTECTION LAW 256 
(2013). 
 222. Opinion of the Article 29 Data Protection Working Party on the Definition of 
Consent, at 13–14, 01197/11/EN WP187 (July 13, 2011) [hereinafter Article 29 Opinion 
on Consent]. 
 223. C-291/12, Schwarz v. Stadt Bochum, EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS 0291 ¶ 32 
(Oct. 17, 2013) (CJEU). 
 224. Article 29 Opinion on Consent, supra note 222, at 9.  
 225. See, e.g., Acquisti & Grossklags, supra note 93; Daniel J. Solove, Introduction: 
Privacy Self-Management and the Consent Dilemma, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1880 (2013); 
Solon Barocas & Helen Nissenbaum, Big Data’s End Run Around Anonymity and Consent, 
in PRIVACY, BIG DATA, AND THE PUBLIC GOOD: FRAMEWORKS FOR ENGAGEMENT 
44 (Julia Lane et al. eds., 2014); ZUIDERVEEN BORGESIUS, IMPROVING PRIVACY 
PROTECTION, supra note 73. 
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restrictions. A complete lack of re-use restrictions clashes with the purpose 
specification principle.  
V. TYPES OF DATA 
Compromises are possible to balance privacy and open data interests. 
This balancing act may play out differently for different types of data. To 
help balance the different interests, we distinguish between four data 
categories, with different levels of privacy risks: (A) raw personal data, (B) 
pseudonymized data, (C) anonymized data, and (D) non-personal data. 
We borrow the “raw personal data” category from Tim Davies, and 
borrow the other three categories from the Article 29 Working Party.226 
We distinguish the four categories to structure the discussion, but the 
boundaries between them are not clear-cut, as noted in Section V.E. 
A. RAW PERSONAL DATA  
With raw personal data, no attempt has been made to mitigate re-
identification risks. Examples of raw personal data include names, social 
security numbers, and personal email addresses. Some open data advocates 
suggest that open data should never include raw personal data.227 Indeed, 
while open data policy is important, releasing raw personal data without 
any re-use restrictions is usually neither desirable nor legally feasible. 
However, in some circumstances raw personal data should be 
disclosed, because the public interests in disclosure outweigh the privacy 
interests. For instance, say a public registry of judges reveals positions and 
jobs judges hold elsewhere, to uphold impartiality of the judiciary. If these 
data did not identify individual judges, disclosure would not offer 
 
 226. Tim Davies, Untangling the Data Debate: Definitions and Implications, 
OPENDATAIMPACTS.NET (Mar. 23, 2012), http://www.opendataimpacts.net/2012/03/
untangling-the-open-data-debate-definitions-and-implications; Opinion of the Article 29 
Data Protection Working Party on Anonymisation Techniques, 0829/14/EN WP 216, (Apr. 
10, 2014) [hereinafter Article 29 Opinion on Anonymisation Techniques]. See also HALL ET 
AL., NOMINET TRUST, supra note 197.  
 227. For instance, Wendy Hall et al. say that raw personal data “should never be 
directly published as openly licensed and accessible data without explicit consent of the 
individuals covered in the data.” HALL ET AL., NOMINET TRUST, supra note 197, at 14. 
Tim Berners-Lee and Nigel Shadbolt, two authors who promote open data, say that “[i]n 
the drive to free up data we have always argued that it is essential to respect individual 
privacy and national security.” Tim Berners-Lee & Nigel Shadbolt, There’s Gold to be 
Mined from All Our Data, TIMES (London), Dec. 31, 2011. 
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sufficient transparency.228 More generally, people must accept that their 
privacy diminishes if they take on certain functions in the public sector. 
For example, it is widely accepted that media can report on politicians, 
even when politicians might sometimes prefer that certain information 
remain confidential.229  
But the fact that certain raw personal data should be disclosed does not 
imply that they should be disclosed as open data without re-use 
restrictions. Even if a law states that certain information must be made 
public, it does not necessarily follow that such information should be 
released fully openly. By 1972, some already argued that “the assumptions 
built into 19th century ideals of public records need revisiting in light of 
technology.”230 And as Scassa notes, “[i]n many cases, decisions around the 
public nature of the information were made in an era before the 
Internet.”231 Hence, personal data that are required to be public by law 
should not automatically be seen as data that can be released as fully open 
data.  
To illustrate, in many countries court proceedings are mandated to be 
public. But if court proceedings can only be consulted by traveling to the 
courthouse and inspecting paper files, the personal information in those 
files is protected by “practical obscurity.”232 As the U.S. Supreme Court 
noted in 1989, “there is a vast difference between the public records that 
might be found after a diligent search of courthouse files, county archives, 
and local police stations throughout the country and a computerized 
summary located in a single clearinghouse of information.”233  
In sum, even if the law requires disclosing certain personal information 
as part of the public record, the public sector body should still assess 
whether this information should also be made available as open data on 
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the web.234 As we shall argue in Part VI, the question of whether or not 
data should be made available as open data is a further, additional question 
that follows the question of whether the data should be made publicly 
available at all. 
B. PSEUDONYMIZED DATA  
Pseudonymized data are personal data about an individual that are tied 
to a unique identifier other than a name. For instance, “William Carey 
Jones” could be referred to as person number “4.417.749.” 
Pseudonymization can be described as follows: “replacing one attribute 
(typically a unique attribute) in a record by another.”235 Merely substituting 
names with other unique identifiers is rarely enough to anonymize 
personal data, or to safeguard privacy.236 
A well-known example of the limited effect of pseudonymization as an 
anonymization measure is the 2006 AOL data breach. AOL released 
pseudonymized data about users of its search engine by replacing the name 
of each searcher with a number.237 However, journalists soon found out 
the real name of the person behind one of the pseudonymous search 
profiles and published an article entitled A Face is Exposed for AOL Searcher 
No. 4417749.238 The journalists found the woman behind search profile 
4417749 without using sophisticated re-identification techniques.239 The 
search queries of user number 4417749 suggested that the searcher was an 
elderly woman with a dog, from a specific town.240 When the journalists 
visited her house, she confirmed that the searches were hers.241  
The Article 29 Working Party suggests that pseudonymized data are a 
type of personal data, and are thus within the scope of European data 
protection law.242 Some computer scientists have a similar view.243 
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However, the Working Party’s view has also been criticized for making 
the scope of personal data too broad.244 
While pseudonymizing personal data rarely, if ever, makes people non-
identifiable, pseudonymization can help to protect privacy interests, by 
making it a bit harder to recognize people by name.245 For instance, 
Conley et al. suggest that pseudonymization can help to mitigate privacy 
concerns when court cases are published online.246 If people’s names are 
changed to “[party 1]” and “[party 2]” in judgments, it would be 
impossible to search within court records on the basis of a person’s name. 
Pseudonymization also reduces the chance that somebody who looks at 
the data will recognize a person by name. However, it might still be 
possible to recognize people based on the facts of a case discussed in the 
judgment. Nevertheless, pseudonymization adds a thin layer of practical 
obscurity.247 
Different countries have different traditions. In the Netherlands, many 
court decisions are published online on a centralized website.248 But if the 
litigating parties are individuals, their names are changed to neutral 
phrases such as “plaintiff” and “defendant.”249 In other countries, litigants’ 
names are often included in court documents, even when published 
online.250 
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In sum, pseudonymization can help to reduce privacy risks—it is a 
useful but not sufficient security measure. Because pseudonymizing data is 
not enough to anonymize data, pseudonymous data must generally be 
treated as personal data. 
C. ANONYMIZED DATA  
Anonymized data are ex-personal data that are rendered anonymous in 
such a way that data subjects are no longer identifiable. Aggregated data 
are typically anonymous. For instance, the information that “112,580 
people live in Berkeley,” without additional information, does not identify 
an individual. Anonymization can be defined as “a technique applied to 
personal data in order to achieve irreversible de-identification.”251 
Anonymized data are outside the scope of the FIPs, as the FIPs only apply 
to personal data.  
The fact that personal data can be aggregated and thereby anonymized 
seems an appropriate way to strike a balance between privacy interests and 
open data interests.252 For instance, statistics can often be disclosed as 
open data, as long as they are anonymized and aggregated.253 To illustrate, 
a crime map could say that on a certain day, “between one and ten 
burglaries took place on or near Bancroft Way,” rather than “one burglary 
took place at 11 Bancroft Way.” Traffic data could say that “between one 
and ten cars drove on Bancroft Way between April 15 and April 20, 
2015,” rather than “one car drove on Bancroft Way on April 19, 2015 at 
12:24 A.M.” 
But two caveats are in order. First, anonymizing data does not 
guarantee privacy and fairness.254 For instance, the Dutch public reacted 
angrily when the police used aggregated information derived from data 
gathered by TomTom, a vendor of car navigation systems.255 The police 
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used the data to choose the best spots to install speeding cameras.256 The 
Dutch Data Protection Authority examined whether TomTom’s practices 
complied with E.U. data privacy law, and did not find major problems.257 
The data obtained by the police were properly anonymized through 
aggregation, and thus outside the scope of the FIPs.258  
The TomTom example illustrates a broader problem: the FIPs apply 
to personal data—and only to personal data. But people can be treated 
unfairly, or feel like they are being treated unfairly, on the basis of 
information that is based on personal data concerning them, but that is not 
personal data anymore.259 Moreover, as the aggregated information is 
outside the scope of the FIPs, the data subject rights that follow from the 
FIPs, such as access and correction rights, no longer apply. As Seda 
Gürses notes, anonymization can “disempower” the individual.260 The 
FIPs and most data privacy laws around the world have this problem in 
common.261 We will not attempt to solve the problem here. But we do 
note that sometimes a public sector body may want to decide not to release 
anonymized information, even if the information is outside the of FIPs’ 
scope. 
A second caveat is that anonymized data are often less interesting for 
re-users than raw personal data or pseudonymous data. As Bendert 
Zevenbergen et al. put it:  
The utility and privacy of data are generally directly and inversely 
related. For many datasets, it has proven difficult—if not 
impossible—to increase data subjects’ privacy without 
concurrently decreasing the overall utility of the dataset. Small 
privacy gains are generally achieved by far-reaching decreases in 
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data utility. A small increase in data utility often requires much 
more personal information to be revealed.262  
In sum, anonymized data can—in theory—safely be disclosed as open 
data, without re-use restrictions. However, in practice, irreversible 
anonymization is exceedingly difficult, and perhaps impossible. 
D. NON-PERSONAL DATA  
A fourth type of data is non-personal data. Many datasets do not 
contain, and have never contained, personal data. Examples include 
datasets regarding public transport times, weather conditions, sea tides, 
road maps, public sector budgets, and environmental pollution.263 Such 
datasets have little to do with information about individuals, and do not 
fall under the purview of the FIPs. 
The FIPs do not hinder releasing datasets with non-personal data. 
Hence, strict compliance with the FIPs does not necessarily interfere with 
releasing public sector information. Some suggest that “[m]ost open 
datasets have nothing personal to be protected in them (e.g.: digital maps, 
public budgets, air pollution measurements etc.).”264  
But even for non-personal data, there are caveats. First, sometimes 
there may be non-privacy related arguments against releasing data. For 
instance, some information may have to remain confidential because of 
state security, such as information regarding critical infrastructure 
locations.265 Second, as discussed in the next section, a dataset with non-
personal data may, on closer inspection, include information about an 
individual.  
In sum, we distinguish between four data categories with different risk 
levels: raw personal data, pseudonymous data, anonymized data, and non-
personal data. However, the categories cannot be neatly distinguished in 
practice, as discussed next. 
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E. FUZZY BOUNDARIES 
The borders between the four data categories are fuzzy. While many 
data privacy laws make a distinction between personal data and 
anonymized data, computer science suggests that the distinction is a 
matter of degree rather than kind.266 Irreversible anonymization is 
difficult—perhaps impossible.267 Apart from that, it is possible to 
distinguish sub-categories within the four categories. For instance, 
Zevenbergen et al. distinguish between three types of purportedly 
anonymized data, with different levels of re-identification risk.268 And it is 
debatable whether data about an individual tied to his or her social security 
number should be seen as raw personal data or as pseudonymized data. 
Whether data are sufficiently anonymized is difficult to assess in 
advance. This is especially so, as more datasets may become available that 
enable “jigsaw identification.”269 The more data public sector bodies 
release, the higher the potential for combining data and thus creating 
information that can identify people.270 The Obama administration 
recognizes this, and urges departments and agencies to perform a risk 
analysis.271 
Even purportedly non-personal data can provide information about an 
individual. For example, a dataset with local air pollution levels contains 
non-personal data. However, if the dataset says that zip code 94720 is the 
most polluted, and the only business in that zip code is a one-man 
business, the pollution level in that zip code can say something about the 
business owner—namely that he or she is likely polluting. We do not 
suggest that privacy should enable business owners to escape responsibility 
for polluting. We merely want to illustrate that even datasets with non-
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personal data can provide information about an individual, for instance 
after linking datasets.272 
In conclusion, we distinguish between four data categories with 
different risks levels: raw personal data, pseudonymous data, anonymized 
data, and non-personal data. The next section shows that open data 
should not be considered the only route when arguments for disclosure 
outweigh privacy interests. Options other than releasing data as open data 
are also available, such as disclosing data with access or re-use restrictions. 
VI. TYPES OF DISCLOSURE  
A maximalist approach to publishing public sector information as open 
data might imply that a public sector body should not impose any 
conditions on accessing or re-using public sector information. But a more 
moderate view is that public sector bodies should be allowed to impose 
conditions for access and re-use, if this is required to protect privacy 
interests.  
We distinguish between three types of disclosure with different 
degrees of openness: (A) restricted access, (B) restricted use, and (C) open 
data. Restrictions on access and restrictions on re-use can be combined. 
Some forms of access and re-use restrictions do not comply with certain 
definitions of “open” data.273 But sometimes disclosing data with 
restrictions is better than not disclosing at all.274  
A. DISCLOSURE WITH ACCESS RESTRICTIONS 
The first way to balance privacy and open data policy is by restricting 
access. To achieve a particular objective that underpins open data, it might 
not be necessary to allow everyone access, or to allow access to the raw 
data held by a public sector body. Data can be disclosed to particular 
groups for particular purposes, rather than to anybody for any purpose. 
Completely blocking data release on the one hand, and releasing data as 
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open data on the other hand, can be seen as two extremes on a continuum. 
Disclosing data with restrictions is in between those two extremes. 
There are various ways to disclose data, which bring different risk 
levels. For example, Zevenbergen et al. distinguish open data from 
“restricted” disclosure, “managed access,” “interactive methods,” and 
“hybrid” methods.275  
With “restricted” disclosure, data are only disclosed “to persons or 
organisations on request, refusing dissemination when the level of risk is 
considered too high.”276 Zevenbergen et al. suggest, for instance, that it is 
riskier to disclose data to a company than to academic researchers.277 One 
problem with this type of disclosure is that it is hard to monitor what a 
receiving party does with the data.  
With managed access, “[t]hird parties can query the dataset and 
conduct statistical (or other) analysis. Such an approach allows the 
researcher to ascertain exactly who accesses the datasets, while maintaining 
control over its dissemination.”278 For instance, researchers might have to 
visit the offices of the public sector body to inspect data.279 
An example of an interactive method is “differential privacy.”280 As 
Zevenbergen et al. explain:  
Differential Privacy . . . only gives statistical answers to queries 
about an underlying dataset. To protect privacy even further, a 
certain amount of noise is added to the disclosed statistical data. 
In principle, differential privacy offers a lower risk for privacy, 
but there are certain limitations to this approach that need to be 
understood. For example, the uncertainty related by the addition 
of noise to the data can be exhausted, which means the 
dissemination must then stop.281 
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Hybrid approaches are also possible. For instance, parts of a dataset 
could be disclosed publicly, while other parts of the set could be kept 
confidential, or could be disclosed with strict access restrictions.282  
In sum, sometimes a compromise between openness and privacy can 
be found by releasing data with access restrictions. Apart from access 
restrictions, it is also possible to restrict re-use, as discussed next.  
B. DISCLOSURE WITH RE-USE RESTRICTIONS 
Another way to strike a balance between privacy and open data policy 
is by applying restrictions on re-use of the disclosed data.283 For instance, 
re-use restrictions can come in the form of licenses.284 The license could 
require re-users not to re-identify data. Such measures have been used in 
practice. For example, on the website of the U.S. Healthcare Cost and 
Utilization Project, data users can purchase data sets—but if they purchase 
a dataset, they must sign an agreement that “expressly prohibits any 
attempt to identify individuals.”285  
The Article 29 Working Party suggests that the license should 
“prohibit license-holders from using the data to take any measure or 
decision with regard to the individuals concerned.”286 The license should 
also require “the license-holder to notify the licensor in case it is detected 
that individuals can be or have been re-identified.”287 As proper 
anonymization is difficult, in some situations, anonymized datasets should 
only be released under a license regime, rather than as fully open data. The 
higher the risk of de-anonymization, the more reason to tie a license to a 
dataset.  
Access and re-use restrictions can also be combined. For instance, 
researchers could be required to visit the office of a public sector body to 
inspect a dataset: an access restriction. But at the same time, the 
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researchers could be required to not try to re-identify people in the dataset: 
a re-use restriction.  
C. DISCLOSURE AS OPEN DATA  
The third access type is releasing data as fully open data: with no 
access or re-use restrictions. For instance, perhaps some personal data 
included in lobbying or company registers should be released as open data. 
Restricting access or re-use might make it too difficult to analyze the 
influence of lobbyists or to hold companies accountable.288 
In conclusion, sometimes a balance can be struck between open data 
goals and privacy by disclosing data with access or re-use restrictions, 
rather than as fully open data. Hence, a public sector body must first assess 
whether a dataset should be disclosed at all. If it is decided that data 
should be disclosed, the next question is whether the data should be 
released with access or re-use restrictions, or as fully open data. 
VII. A CIRCUMSTANCE CATALOGUE TO INFORM 
DISCLOSURE DECISIONS 
The above suggests that public sector bodies should decide on a case-
by-case basis whether, and under which conditions, a dataset should be 
disclosed.289 Narayanan et al. note that “[e]ach dataset has its own risk-
benefit tradeoff, in which the expected damage done by leaked 
information must be weighed against the expected benefit from improved 
analysis.”290 The researchers add that “[b]oth assessments are complicated 
by the unpredictable effects of combining the dataset with others, which 
may escalate both the losses and the gains.”291  
There is not one clear-cut rule to decide whether datasets including or 
based on personal data should be disclosed. The lack of a hard-and-fast 
rule is not surprising. As discussed supra in Part III, the problem of 
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balancing privacy and open data interests can be seen as a modern version 
of the problem of balancing privacy and public sector transparency.  
The objectives behind open data policies and corresponding public 
interests involved merit closer scrutiny; this allows for differentiation that 
is necessary for balancing the interests involved.292 The general FIPs 
guidance suggesting a balance between privacy and other interests is not 
detailed enough in the case of open data. We propose that a circumstance 
catalogue can help to decide whether and how to release data.293 The 
circumstance catalogue lists circumstances, or factors, that should be 
considered when assessing whether, and under which conditions, a dataset 
should be released, as well as different options for how it should be 
released. We provide a list as a starting point for a debate—the list is not 
meant to be exhaustive or final. The circumstance catalogue can be 
extended, for instance, by taking inspiration from case law, freedom of 
information law, and guidelines regarding open data and privacy.  
We mention some rules of thumb regarding re-identification risks and 
releasing data. One rule of thumb is that raw personal data should 
generally not be released as fully open data, unless there is a compelling 
public interest argument for choosing this route for disclosure over other 
available options.294 We argue that pseudonymous data must generally be 
treated as a type of personal data, rather than as anonymous data. On the 
other hand, non-personal data can generally be released as open data. For 
purportedly anonymized data, it is more complicated. As stated previously, 
irreversible anonymization is difficult, and perhaps impossible to 
achieve.295 Therefore, in some cases anonymized data should not be 
released as fully open data.  
A. WEIGHT OF THE GOALS PURSUED 
The goals pursued by disclosing data are relevant. The consideration is 
not only what the (theoretical) aim of the public body is. An assessment 
might also be made of the most likely uses of the data by other public 
bodies, the private sector, and citizens. True, this runs counter to the idea 
behind open data that serendipitous re-use is positive, and that it is 
 
 292. See Scassa, supra note 71, at 405.  
 293. For a similar approach, balancing interests in access to court records against 
other considerations, see Conley, Datta, Nissenbaum & Sharma, supra note 234, at 797–
98. 
 294. Narayanan et al. reach a similar conclusion. NARAYANAN, HUEY & FELTEN, 
supra note 217, at 15 (“[I]t almost never will be the case that an unlimited release of a 
dataset to the entire public will be the optimal choice.”).  
 295. See supra Section V.E. See also Narayanan & Shmatikov, supra note 266, at 26. 
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impossible for the government to predict potential uses.296 But it is naïve 
to assume that uses will all be benevolent.  
What is the primary goal pursued with releasing data and how 
important is releasing this type of information, in this form, to achieving 
that goal? Could the objective be adequately addressed by disclosing 
information in a less privacy-sensitive form? Is it likely that the data will 
be used primarily by the press or similar public watchdogs, or are the data 
primarily interesting for commercial purposes?297 The more relevant data 
are to key aspects of democratic participation, the stronger the case for 
release as open data. As Daniel Solove notes, when deciding whether to 
release personal data, political transparency has more weight than pure 
commercial interests of re-users: 
Access should be granted for uses furthering traditional functions 
of transparency such as the watchdog function; access should be 
denied for commercial solicitation uses because such uses do not 
adequately serve the functions of transparency. Rather, such uses 
make public records a cheap marketing tool, resulting in the 
further spread of personal information, which is often resold 
among marketers.298  
Furthermore, not all uses of public sector information are equal before 
the law. Additionally, the national legal system makes a difference. For 
instance, the strength of rights to access to information and the 
discretionary space for public authorities differ from country to country. 
For example, in the United States, the First Amendment influences 
decisions regarding data disclosure.299 In Europe, access to information to 
foster political transparency also has backing in human rights treaties.300 
But in Europe, legal privacy and data protection rights have more relative 
 
 296. For example, the G8 Open Data Charter contains the pledge of governments to 
ensure “that the data are available to the widest range of users for the widest range of 
purposes.” G8 OPEN DATA CHARTER, supra note 1. Assessing the market for public 
sector information based products and services in the U.K, Deloitte concludes that “it is 
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innovation takes place in areas which are hard to predict.” DELOITTE, MARKET 
ASSESSMENT OF PUBLIC SECTOR INFORMATION, supra note 38, at 41. 
 297. The U.S. Supreme Court noted that different purposes have different weights in 
the context of inspecting and copying judicial records. Nixon v. Warner Commc’ns, Inc., 
435 U.S. 589 (1978). In the FOIA context, the Supreme Court arrived at a similar 
conclusion. U.S. Dep’t of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 
749, 773 (1989). 
 298. Solove, supra note 7, at 1192.  
 299. See id. at 1200–06; see also Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653 (2011).  
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weight than in the United States.301 An important factor in this respect is 
the role of people whose data are considered for release. Do the data 
concern somebody who holds a public function or a powerful position? 
What is the level of responsibility of the person? To what extent is the 
information needed in open, machine-readable form in order to facilitate 
democratic accountability? The higher the level of responsibility of the 
person, the more likely it is that transparency trumps privacy interests. 
While access to information to foster democratic transparency has 
backing in constitutions and human rights documents, the legal backing of 
releasing information for business opportunities or for improving public 
sector efficiency is less evident.302 If there is a good case for sharing data 
within the public sector because this contributes to efficient government, 
governments should regulate such sharing with specific laws that contain 
appropriate safeguards. Cost and efficiency savings in and of themselves 
may not outweigh the protection of individual privacy unless there are 
other overriding concerns about, for example, public accountability, 
corruption, or the exercise of democratic oversight. 
Apart from the difference in national legal systems, the weight of the 
goal also depends on the national situation. For example, in a country 
where there are many problems with corruption by state officials, 
disclosing detailed wealth records of public functionaries makes more 
sense than in a country with virtually no corruption. And in some 
countries there may be more widespread acceptance of the public 
disclosure of salaries.303 
B. WEIGHT OF THE PRIVACY INTERESTS 
Arguments against releasing data, or against releasing data without 
restrictions, include the following: there are considerable risks associated 
with releasing the data; the potential harm is serious, rather than a minor 
inconvenience; the privacy of many people (not a few) is at risk; and the 
privacy threat is immediate rather than remote. For instance, a theoretical 
privacy infringement has less weight than would a clear danger. A clear 
privacy danger might occur, for example, with a dataset containing names 
of people with HIV. People could be discriminated against if it becomes 
publicly known that they have HIV. 
 
 301. See generally Kranenborg, supra note 139. 
 302. The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union does recognize the 
right to do business. E.U. Charter of Fundamental Rights, supra note 68, art. 16. 
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The nature of the harm also matters: for example, if the data relate to 
people fulfilling public functions and concern professional conduct, a risk 
of reputational harm is unlikely to be of concern (unless there is doubt 
about the accuracy of the data). That would be the case with disclosing 
expenses claims. If disclosure leads to a security risk, e.g., disclosing an 
itinerary or detailed information about a politician’s movements, the case 
is different. 
Expectations of privacy can also be a factor. How were the data 
collected? If there was a promise or understanding of confidentiality, the 
case is different than if people have volunteered data after they were 
warned of future possible disclosures. Because of asymmetry in 
information relationships between public authorities and citizens, it 
cannot be readily assumed that data was truly volunteered.  
In conclusion, a case-by-case analysis is required when deciding 
whether to release data, and whether the data can be disclosed as fully 
open data, or whether access or use should be restricted. We proposed a 
starting point for a circumstance catalogue that would help to assist in 
decisions about data disclosure. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
Open data are held to contribute to a wide variety of social and 
political goals—including strengthening transparency, public participation, 
and democratic accountability; promoting economic growth and 
innovation; and enabling greater public sector efficiency and cost savings. 
But releasing datasets as open data may threaten privacy, for instance if 
they contain personal or re-identifiable data. Potential privacy problems 
include chilling effects on people communicating with the public sector, a 
lack of individual control over personal information, and discriminatory 
practices enabled by the released data.  
Can privacy and related interests be respected, while not unduly 
hampering open data benefits? The Fair Information Principles (FIPs), as 
expressed in the OECD Privacy Guidelines, provide a framework to 
balance privacy and other interests. From a FIPs perspective, the main 
problem with open data is that it can be used by anyone for any purpose. 
A complete lack of re-use restrictions would clash with the purpose 
specification principle of the FIPs. It follows from the purpose 
specification principle that personal data should only be collected for a 
purpose that is specified in advance, and that those data should not be 
used for incompatible purposes.  
Compromises are possible to balance privacy and open data interests. 
We distinguish between four data categories with different risk levels: raw 
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personal data, pseudonymous data, anonymized data, and non-personal 
data. With raw personal, no attempt has been made to make identification 
harder. Pseudonymous data are data for which the individual’s name is 
changed to another unique identifier. Anonymized data are ex-personal 
data; people cannot be re-identified in the dataset. Non-personal data, 
such as data about weather conditions or public transport times, never 
contain personal data.  
Non-personal data can generally be released without restrictions as 
fully open data. As a rule of thumb, raw personal data should not be 
released as fully open data. Pseudonymous data must generally be treated 
as a type of personal data—not as anonymous data. Anonymized data is 
more complicated. Anonymized data can, in theory, be disclosed as open 
data, without re-use restrictions. However, irreversible anonymization is 
exceedingly difficult, and perhaps impossible. And even in aggregated and 
purportedly anonymized data, individuals can sometimes be re-identified. 
Therefore, some purportedly anonymized datasets should only be 
disclosed with access and re-use restrictions.  
Sometimes, a compromise can be found by releasing anonymized data 
with access and re-use restrictions. Restricting openness can be done in 
various ways. For instance, the public sector body could attach a license to 
the data, requiring the re-user to only use certain data for a certain purpose 
(say medical research) and to promise not to re-identify the data. Other 
limitations on openness can also be envisaged. For instance, if a research 
interest is important, but the personal data are sensitive, researchers could 
be required to visit the lab where the data are held. 
Hence, a case-by-case analysis is required when deciding whether to 
release data, and whether the data can be disclosed as fully open data, or 
whether access or use should be restricted. To assist in decisions about 
data disclosure, a circumstance catalogue may be of help: a list of 
circumstances to consider when deciding about releasing data. For 
instance: what is the goal pursued by releasing the data? Is there another 
way to pursue that goal? What are the risks involved with releasing the 
data? Are the privacy-related risks negligible or probable? If the risk 
materializes, what is the harm that results? Is the privacy of a few or of 
millions of people at stake?  
In conclusion, in many instances public sector datasets that contain, or 
are based on, personal data should not be released as fully open data. 
When arguments for disclosure do outweigh privacy interests, open data 
should not be considered the only route. Other options might include 
disclosing information with access or re-use restrictions. 
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